

The Passions of the Soul

Translator's preface

Descartes' last philosophical work was written in French, printed in Holland, and published in Amsterdam and Paris in 1649 under the title *Les Passions de l'Ame*.¹ The book's publication in Paris seems to have been arranged by a 'friend' whose anonymous letters, with Descartes' replies, forms its preface.

Descartes composed the work largely at the urging of Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (1618–80), and its origin can be traced in their correspondence. Elizabeth first mentions the passions when, wondering how the soul can be governed by the body given that they have nothing in common, she asks Descartes to explain 'the manner of [the soul's] actions and passions in the body' (20 June 1643). Descartes' reply – that the body causes the soul to have feelings and passions, and the soul causes the body to move, through an inexplicable 'union' between the soul and body – did not satisfy the princess. Nor was she satisfied when Descartes sought to answer her question with vague moralizing and practical advice for the control of the passions. Eventually she insisted that he give 'a definition of the passions, in order to make them well known' (13 September 1645). Descartes obliged by producing a little 'treatise on the passions' which he gave to Elizabeth in 1646. In the following year he entered into correspondence with Queen Christina of Sweden (1626–89), to whom he also sent a copy of the 'little treatise', which reportedly she read while hunting. This treatise, possibly a draft of the first two parts of the published work, seems also to have been seen by Clerselier, to whom Descartes says, in a letter of 23 April 1649, that he has been 'indolent in revising it and in adding the things you thought lacking, which will increase its length by a third'.

Invited to Sweden by Queen Christina, Descartes arrived in Stockholm in October 1649, a month before publication of *The Passions of the Soul*. Suffering from the rigours of the Swedish winter and the tedium of his courtly duties (which included giving lessons to the Queen at five o'clock in the morning), he contracted pneumonia and died in Stockholm on 11 February 1650.

R.S.

1 The translation below follows the text in volume XI of Adam and Tannery; see General Introduction, p. x above.

Prefatory letters

[The preface comprises a 'Notice from a friend of the author', two letters from the friend to Descartes, and Descartes' replies to these letters. The identity of the friend is unknown: several suggestions have been made (e.g. Clerselier, Picot, and Descartes himself), but none has been conclusively established. In the 'Notice' the friend asserts that Descartes sent him the work and gave him permission to add a preface and get it published, and that he proposes to make the preface consist simply of his correspondence with Descartes since this contains 'many points of which I believe the public would wish to be informed'. In his first letter, dated Paris, 6 November 1648, the friend complains about Descartes' failure to show him the treatise on the passions when they met in Paris the previous summer. Reproaching Descartes for the 'negligence and other faults' which keep him from pursuing his scientific research as actively as he ought, the friend threatens to publish the letter, so as to shame Descartes into greater activity and encourage public support for his research. Here is Descartes' reply.]

AT XI Sir,

323 Among the insults and reproaches which I find in the long letter you have taken the trouble to write me, I observe many things to my advantage – so many, indeed, that if you had this letter published, as you said you would, I fear it might be imagined that we were more closely associated than in fact we are, and that I had asked you to include things in the letter which decency forbade me to utter in public myself. That is why I shall not pause here to reply point by point. I shall merely give you two reasons which, I think, should prevent you from publishing this letter. First, I do not believe you can possibly achieve the aim which I assume you had in writing it. Second, my attitude is not at all what you imagine it to be. It is not indignation or disgust which prevents me from wishing to do everything in my power to serve the public. For I consider myself indebted to it for the favourable reception which many people have given to the works I have already published. I have not previously shown you my writings on the passions simply because I did not wish to be obliged

to show it to certain other persons who would not have made good use of it. In fact I had composed it only to be read by a princess whose mental powers are so extraordinary that she can easily understand matters which seem very difficult to our learned doctors. So the only points I explained at length in it are those I thought to be novel. Lest you should doubt what I say, I promise to revise this work on the passions and add whatever I think necessary in order to make it more intelligible; then I shall send it to you, and you may do with it whatever you please. For I am, etc.

Egmont, 4 December 1648.

[In the second letter, dated 23 July 1649, the friend complains that he has not yet received the treatise, and says that he is beginning to think that Descartes promised to send it only to prevent publication of his previous letter. Here is Descartes' reply.]

Sir,

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You are determined to think that I have used an artifice in order to prevent you from publishing the long letter which you wrote to me last year. I am quite innocent of this artifice; nor did I have any need to use it. For apart from the fact that I do not believe your letter could produce the effect you claim, I am not so lazy that my desire to gain self-instruction and to write something useful for other men could be overpowered by fear of the work to which I would be committed if I received from the public the means of putting many observations¹ to the test. I cannot make excuses so easily for the negligence for which you blame me. For I confess that I have spent more time in revising the little treatise I am sending you than I had previously spent in composing it. And yet I have added only a few things to it, and I have changed nothing in the style, whose simplicity and brevity will reveal that my intention was to explain the passions only as a natural philosopher, and not as a rhetorician or even as a moral philosopher. Thus, I foresee that this treatise will fare less well than my other writings. Though more people may perhaps be drawn by its title to read it, yet only those who take the trouble to study it with care can possibly be satisfied with it. Such as it is, then, I put it into your hands, etc.

Egmont, 14 August 1649.

1 *Fr. expériences*; see footnote, p. 143 above.

PART ONE

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The Passions in General

and incidentally the whole nature of man

1. *What is a passion with regard to one subject is always an action in some other regard*

328 The defects of the sciences we have from the ancients are nowhere more apparent than in their writings on the passions. This topic, about which knowledge has always been keenly sought, does not seem to be one of the more difficult to investigate since everyone feels passions in himself and so has no need to look elsewhere for observations to establish their nature. And yet the teachings of the ancients about the passions are so meagre and for the most part so implausible that I cannot hope to approach the truth except by departing from the paths they have followed. That is why I shall be obliged to write just as if I were considering a topic that no one had dealt with before me. In the first place, I note that whatever takes place or occurs is generally called by philosophers a 'passion' with regard to the subject to which it happens and an 'action' with regard to that which makes it happen. Thus, although an agent and patient are often quite different, an action and passion must always be a single thing which has these two names on account of the two different subjects to which it may be related.

2. *To understand the passions of the soul we must distinguish its functions from those of the body*

Next I note that we are not aware of any subject which acts more directly upon our soul than the body to which it is joined. Consequently we should recognize that what is a passion in the soul is usually an action in the body. Hence there is no better way of coming to know about our passions than by examining the difference between the soul and the body, in order to learn to which of the two we should attribute each of the functions present in us.

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3. *The rule we must follow in order to do this*

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We shall not find this very difficult if we bear in mind that anything we experience as being in us, and which we see can also exist in wholly inanimate bodies, must be attributed only to our body. On the other hand, anything in us which we cannot conceive in any way as capable of belonging to a body must be attributed to our soul.

4. *The heat and the movement of the limbs proceed from the body, and thoughts from the soul*

Thus, because we have no conception of the body as thinking in any way at all, we have reason to believe that every kind of thought present in us belongs to the soul. And since we do not doubt that there are inanimate bodies which can move in as many different ways as our bodies, if not more, and which have as much heat or more (as experience shows in the case of a flame, which has in itself much more heat and movement than any of our limbs), we must believe that all the heat and all the movements present in us, in so far as they do not depend on thought, belong solely to the body.

5. *It is an error to believe that the soul gives movement and heat to the body*

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In this way we shall avoid a very serious error which many have fallen into, and which I regard as the primary cause of our failure up to now to give a satisfactory explanation of the passions and of everything else belonging to the soul. The error consists in supposing that since dead bodies are devoid of heat and movement, it is the absence of the soul which causes this cessation of movement and heat. Thus it has been believed, without justification, that our natural heat and all the movements of our bodies depend on the soul; whereas we ought to hold, on the contrary, that the soul takes its leave when we die only because this heat ceases and the organs which bring about bodily movement decay.

6. *The difference between a living body and a dead body*

So as to avoid this error, let us note that death never occurs through the absence of the soul, but only because one of the principal parts of the body decays. And let us recognize that the difference between the body of a living man and that of a dead man is just like the difference 331 between, on the one hand, a watch or other automaton (that is, a self-moving machine) when it is wound up and contains in itself the corporeal principle of the movements for which it is designed, together with everything else required for its operation; and, on the other hand, the

same watch or machine when it is broken and the principle of its movement ceases to be active.

7. *A brief account of the parts of the body and of some of their functions*

To make this more intelligible I shall explain in a few words the way in which the mechanism of our body is composed. Everyone knows that within us there is a heart, brain, stomach, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins, and similar things. We know too that the food we eat goes down to the stomach and bowels, and that its juice then flows into the liver and all the veins, where it mixes with the blood they contain, thus increasing its quantity. Those who have heard anything at all about medicine know in addition how the heart is constructed and how the blood in the veins can flow easily from the vena cava into its right-hand side, pass from there into the lungs through the vessel called the arterial vein, then return from the lungs into the left-hand side of the heart through the vessel called the venous artery, and finally pass from there into the great artery, whose branches spread through the whole body. Likewise all those not completely blinded by the authority of the ancients, and willing to open their eyes to examine the opinion of Harvey regarding the circulation of the blood, do not doubt that the veins and arteries of the body are like streams through which the blood flows constantly and with great rapidity. It makes its way from the right-hand cavity of the heart through the arterial vein, whose branches are spread throughout the lungs and connected with those of the venous artery; and via this artery it passes from the lungs into the left-hand side of the heart. From there it goes into the great artery, whose branches are spread through the rest of the body and connected with the branches of the vena cava, which carries the same blood once again into the right-hand cavity of the heart. These two cavities are thus like sluices through which all the blood passes upon each complete circuit it makes through the body. It is known, moreover, that every movement of the limbs depends on the muscles, which are opposed to each other in such a way that when one of them becomes shorter it draws towards itself the part of the body to which it is attached, which simultaneously causes the muscle opposed to it to lengthen. Then, if the latter happens to shorten at some other time, it makes the former lengthen again, and draws towards itself the part to which they are attached. Finally, it is known that all these movements of the muscles, and likewise all sensations, depend on the nerves, which are like little threads or tubes coming from the brain and containing, like the brain itself, a certain very fine¹ air or wind which is called the 'animal spirits'.

1 Fr. *subtil*; see note 1, p. 316 above.

8. *The principle underlying all these functions*

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But it is not commonly known how these animal spirits and nerves help to produce movements and sensations, or what corporeal principle makes them act. That is why, although I have already touched upon this question in other writings, I intend to speak briefly about it here.¹ While we are alive there is a continual heat in our hearts, which is a kind of fire that the blood of the veins maintains there. This fire is the corporeal principle underlying all the movements of our limbs.

9. *How the movement of the heart takes place*

Its first effect is that it makes the blood which fills the cavities of the heart expand. This causes the blood, now needing to occupy a larger space, to rush from the right-hand cavity into the arterial vein and from the left-hand cavity into the great artery. Then, when this expansion ceases, fresh blood immediately enters the right-hand cavity of the heart from the vena cava, and the left-hand cavity from the venous artery. For there are tiny membranes at the entrances to these four vessels which are so arranged that the blood can enter the heart only through the latter two and leave it only through the former two. When the new blood has entered the heart it is immediately rarefied in the same way as before. This and this alone is what the pulse or beating of the heart and arteries consists in, and it explains why the beating is repeated each time new blood enters the heart. It is also the sole cause of the movement of the blood, making it flow constantly and very rapidly in all the arteries and veins, so that it carries the heat it acquires in the heart to all the other parts of the body, and provides them with nourishment.

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10. *How the animal spirits are produced in the brain*

What is, however, more worthy of consideration here is that all the most lively and finest parts of the blood, which have been rarefied by the heat in the heart, constantly enter the cavities of the brain in large numbers. What makes them go there rather than elsewhere is that all the blood leaving the heart through the great artery follows a direct route towards this place, and since not all this blood can enter there because the passages are too narrow, only the most active and finest parts pass into it while the rest spread out into the other regions of the body. Now these very fine parts of the blood make up the animal spirits. For them to do this the only change they need to undergo in the brain is to be separated from the other less fine parts of the blood. For what I am calling 'spirits' here are merely bodies: they have no property other than

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¹ See *Discourse*, part 5, pp. 135–9 above.

that of being extremely small bodies which move very quickly, like the jets of flame that come from a torch. They never stop in any place, and as some of them enter the brain's cavities, others leave it through the pores in its substance. These pores conduct them into the nerves, and then to the muscles. In this way the animal spirits move the body in all the various ways it can be moved.

II. How the movements of the muscles take place

For, as already mentioned, the sole cause of all the movements of the limbs is the shortening of certain muscles and the lengthening of the opposed muscles. What causes one muscle to become shorter rather than its opposite is simply that fractionally more spirits from the brain come to it than to the other. Not that the spirits which come directly from the brain are sufficient by themselves to move the muscles; but they cause the other spirits already in the two muscles to leave one of them very suddenly and pass into the other. In this way the one they leave becomes
 336 longer and more relaxed, and the one they enter, being suddenly swollen by them, becomes shorter and pulls the limb to which it is attached. This is easy to understand, provided one knows that very few animal spirits come continually from the brain to each muscle, and that any muscle always contains a quantity of its own spirits. These move very quickly, sometimes merely eddying in the place where they are located (that is, when they find no passages open for them to leave from), and sometimes flowing into the opposed muscle. In each of the muscles there are small openings through which the spirits may flow from one into the other, and which are so arranged that when the spirits coming from the brain to one of the muscles are slightly more forceful than those going to the other, they open all the passages through which the spirits in the latter can pass into the former, and at the same time they close all the passages through which the spirits in the former can pass into the latter. In this way all the spirits previously contained in the two muscles are gathered very rapidly in one of them, thus making it swell and become shorter, while the other lengthens and relaxes.

12. How external objects act upon the sense organs

We still have to know what causes the spirits not to flow always in the
 337 same way from the brain to the muscles, but to come sometimes more to some muscles than to others. In our case, indeed, one of these causes is the activity of the soul (as I shall explain further on). But in addition we must note two other causes, which depend solely on the body. The first consists in differences in the movements produced in the sense organs by

their objects. I have already explained this quite fully in the *Optics*.¹ But in order that readers of this work should not need to consult any other, I shall say once again that there are three things to consider in the nerves. First, there is the marrow, or internal substance, which extends in the form of tiny fibres from the brain, where they originate, to the extremities of the parts of the body to which they are attached. Next, there are the membranes surrounding the fibres, which are continuous with those surrounding the brain and form little tubes in which the fibres are enclosed. Finally, there are the animal spirits which, being carried by these tubes from the brain to the muscles, cause the fibres to remain so completely free and extended that if anything causes the slightest motion in the part of the body where one of the fibres terminates, it thereby causes a movement in the part of the brain where the fibre originates, just as we make one end of a cord move by pulling the other end.

13. *This action of external objects may direct the spirits into the muscles in various different ways* 338

I explained in the *Optics* how the objects of sight make themselves known to us simply by producing, through the medium of the intervening transparent bodies, local motions in the optic nerve-fibres at the back of our eyes, and then in the regions of the brain where these nerves originate.² I explained too that the objects produce as much variety in these motions as they cause us to see in the things, and that it is not the motions occurring in the eye, but those occurring in the brain, which directly represent these objects to the soul. By this example, it is easy to conceive how sounds, smells, tastes, heat, pain, hunger, thirst and, in general, all the objects both of our external senses and of our internal appetites, also produce some movement in our nerves, which passes through them into the brain. Besides causing our soul to have various different sensations, these various movements in the brain can also act without the soul, causing the spirits to make their way to certain muscles rather than others, and so causing them to move our limbs. I shall prove this here by one example only. If someone suddenly thrusts his hand in front of our eyes as if to strike us, then even if we know that he is our friend, that he is doing this only in fun, and that he will take care not to harm us, we still find it difficult to prevent ourselves from closing our eyes. This shows that it is not through the mediation of our soul that they close, since this action is contrary to our volition, which is the only, or at least the principal, activity of the soul. They close rather because the mechanism of our body is so composed that the movement of the hand

1 See *Optics*, p. 165 above, and also *Treatise on Man*, pp. 101ff above.

2 See *Optics*, p. 167 above.

towards our eyes produces another movement in our brain, which directs the animal spirits into the muscles that make our eyelids drop.

14. *Differences among the spirits may also cause them to take various different courses*

The other cause which serves to direct the animal spirits to the muscles in various different ways is the unequal agitation of the spirits and differences in their parts. For when some of their parts are coarser and more agitated than others, they penetrate more deeply in a straight line into the cavities and pores of the brain, and in this way they are directed to muscles other than those to which they would go if they had less force.

340 15. *The causes of these differences*

And this inequality may arise from the different materials of which the spirits are composed. One sees this in the case of those who have drunk a lot of wine: the vapours of the wine enter the blood rapidly and rise from the heart to the brain, where they turn into spirits which, being stronger and more abundant than those normally present there, are capable of moving the body in many strange ways. Such an inequality of the spirits may also arise from various conditions of the heart, liver, stomach, spleen and all the other organs that help to produce them. In this connection we must first note certain small nerves embedded in the base of the heart, which serve to enlarge and contract the openings to its cavities, thus causing the blood, according to the strength of its expansion, to produce spirits having various different dispositions. It must also be observed that even though the blood entering the heart comes there from every other place in the body, it often happens nevertheless that it is driven there more from some parts than from others, because the nerves and muscles responsible for these parts exert more pressure on it or make it more agitated. And differences in these parts are matched by corresponding differences in the expansion of the blood in the heart, which results in the production of spirits having different qualities. Thus, for
341 example, the blood coming from the lower part of the liver, where the gall is located, expands in the heart in a different manner from the blood coming from the spleen; the latter expands differently from the blood coming from the veins of the arms or legs; and this expands differently again from the alimentary juices when, just after leaving the stomach and bowels, they pass rapidly to the heart through the liver.

16. *How all the limbs can be moved by the objects of the senses and by the spirits without the help of the soul*

Finally it must be observed that the mechanism of our body is so composed that all the changes occurring in the movement of the spirits

may cause them to open some pores in the brain more than others. Conversely, when one of the pores is opened somewhat more or less than usual by an action of the sensory nerves, this brings about a change in the movement of the spirits and directs them to the muscles which serve to move the body in the way it is usually moved on the occasion of such an action. Thus every movement we make without any contribution from our will – as often happens when we breathe, walk, eat and, indeed, when we perform any action which is common to us and the beasts – depends solely on the arrangement of our limbs and on the route which the spirits, produced by the heat of the heart, follow naturally in the brain, nerves and muscles. This occurs in the same way as the movement of a watch is produced merely by the strength of its spring and the configuration of its wheels. 342

17. *The functions of the soul*

Having thus considered all the functions belonging solely to the body, it is easy to recognize that there is nothing in us which we must attribute to our soul except our thoughts. These are of two principal kinds, some being actions of the soul and others its passions. Those I call its actions are all our volitions, for we experience them as proceeding directly from our soul and as seeming to depend on it alone. On the other hand, the various perceptions or modes of knowledge present in us may be called its passions, in a general sense, for it is often not our soul which makes them such as they are, and the soul always receives them from the things that are represented by them.

18. *The will*

Our volitions, in turn, are of two sorts. One consists of the actions of the soul which terminate in the soul itself, as when we will to love God or, generally speaking, to apply our mind to some object which is not material. The other consists of actions which terminate in our body, as when our merely willing to walk has the consequence that our legs move and we walk. 343

19. *Perception*

Our perceptions are likewise of two sorts: some have the soul as their cause, others the body. Those having the soul as their cause are the perceptions of our volitions and of all the imaginings or other thoughts which depend on them. For it is certain that we cannot will anything without thereby perceiving that we are willing it. And although willing

something is an action with respect to our soul, the perception of such willing may be said to be a passion in the soul. But because this perception is really one and the same thing as the volition, and names are always determined by whatever is most noble, we do not normally call it a 'passion', but solely an 'action'.

344 20. *Imaginings and other thoughts formed by the soul*

When our soul applies itself to imagine something non-existent – as in thinking about an enchanted palace or a chimera – and also when it applies itself to consider something that is purely intelligible and not imaginable – for example, in considering its own nature – the perceptions it has of these things depend chiefly on the volition which makes it aware of them. That is why we usually regard these perceptions as actions rather than passions.

21. *Imaginings which are caused solely by the body*

Among the perceptions caused by the body, most of them depend on the nerves. But there are some which do not and which, like those I have just described, are called 'imaginings'. These differ from the others, however, in that our will is not used in forming them. Accordingly they cannot be numbered among the actions of the soul, for they arise simply from the fact that the spirits, being agitated in various different ways and coming upon the traces of various impressions which have preceded them in the brain, make their way by chance through certain pores rather than others. Such are the illusions of our dreams and also the day-dreams we often have when we are awake and our mind wanders idly without applying itself to anything of its own accord. Now some of these imaginings are passions of the soul, taking the word 'passion' in its proper and more exact sense, and all may be regarded as such if the word is understood in a more general sense. Nonetheless, their cause is not so conspicuous and determinate as that of the perceptions which the soul receives by means of the nerves, and they seem to be mere shadows and pictures of these perceptions. So before we can characterize them satisfactorily we must consider how these other perceptions differ from one another.

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22. *How these other perceptions differ from one another*

All the perceptions which I have not yet explained come to the soul by means of the nerves. They differ from one another in so far as we refer

some to external objects which strike our senses, others to our body or to certain of its parts, and still others to our soul.

23. *The perceptions we refer to objects outside us*

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The perceptions we refer to things outside us, namely to the objects of our senses, are caused by these objects, at least when our judgements are not false. For in that case the objects produce certain movements in the organs of the external senses and, by means of the nerves, produce other movements in the brain, which cause the soul to have sensory perception of the objects. Thus, when we see the light of a torch and hear the sound of a bell, the sound and the light are two different actions which, simply by producing two different movements in some of our nerves, and through them in our brain, give to the soul two different sensations. And we refer these sensations to the subjects we suppose to be their causes in such a way that we think that we see the torch itself and hear the bell, and not that we have sensory perception merely of movements coming from these objects.

24. *The perceptions we refer to our body*

The perceptions we refer to our body or to certain of its parts are those of hunger, thirst and other natural appetites. To these we may add pain, heat and the other states we feel as being in our limbs, and not as being in objects outside us. Thus, at the same time and by means of the same nerves we can feel the cold of our hand and the heat of a nearby flame or, on the other hand, the heat of our hand and the cold of the air to which it is exposed. This happens without there being any difference between the actions which make us feel the heat or cold in our hand and those which make us feel the heat or cold outside us, except that since one of these actions succeeds the other, we judge that the first is already in us, and that its successor is not yet there but in the object which causes it.

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25. *The perceptions we refer to our soul*

The perceptions we refer only to the soul are those whose effects we feel as being in the soul itself, and for which we do not normally know any proximate cause to which we can refer them. Such are the feelings of joy, anger and the like, which are aroused in us sometimes by the objects which stimulate our nerves and sometimes also by other causes. Now all our perceptions, both those we refer to objects outside us and those we refer to the various states of our body, are indeed passions with respect to our soul, so long as we use the term 'passion' in its most general sense; nevertheless we usually restrict the term to signify only perceptions which

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refer to the soul itself. And it is only the latter that I have undertaken to explain here under the title 'passions of the soul'.¹

26. *The imaginings which depend solely on the fortuitous movement of the spirits may be passions just as truly as the perceptions which depend on the nerves*


It remains to be noted that everything the soul perceives by means of the nerves may also be represented to it through the fortuitous course of the spirits. The sole difference is that the impressions which come into the brain through the nerves are normally more lively and more definite than those produced there by the spirits – a fact that led me to say in article 21 that the latter are, as it were, a shadow or picture of the former. We must also note that this picture is sometimes so similar to the thing it represents that it may mislead us regarding the perceptions which refer to objects outside us, or even regarding those which refer to certain parts of our body. But we cannot be misled in the same way regarding the passions, in that they are so close and so internal to our soul that it cannot possibly feel them unless they are truly as it feels them to be. Thus

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27. *Definition of the passions of the soul*

After having considered in what respects the passions of the soul differ from all its other thoughts, it seems to me that we may define them generally as those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which

1 The classification given in articles 17–25 may be represented schematically as follows:



we refer particularly to it, and which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the spirits.

28. Explanation of the first part of this definition

We may call them 'perceptions' if we use this term generally to signify all the thoughts which are not actions of the soul or volitions, but not if we use it to signify only evident knowledge. For experience shows that those who are the most strongly agitated by their passions are not those who know them best, and that the passions are to be numbered among the perceptions which the close alliance between the soul and the body renders confused and obscure. We may also call them 'sensations', because they are received into the soul in the same way as the objects of the external senses, and they are not known by the soul any differently. But it is even better to call them 'emotions' of the soul, not only because this term may be applied to all the changes which occur in the soul – that is, to all the various thoughts which come to it – but more particularly because, of all the kinds of thought which the soul may have, there are none that agitate and disturb it so strongly as the passions. 350

29. Explanation of the other part of the definition

I add that they refer particularly to the soul, in order to distinguish them from other sensations, some referred to external objects (e.g. smells, sounds and colours) and others to our body (e.g. hunger, thirst and pain). I also add that they are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the spirits, both in order to distinguish them from our volitions (for these too may be called 'emotions of the soul which refer to it', but they are caused by the soul itself), and also in order to explain their ultimate and most proximate cause, which distinguishes them once again from other sensations.

30. The soul is united to all the parts of the body conjointly

But in order to understand all these things more perfectly, we need to recognize that the soul is really joined to the whole body, and that we cannot properly say that it exists in any one part of the body to the exclusion of the others. For the body is a unity which is in a sense indivisible because of the arrangement of its organs, these being so related to one another that the removal of any one of them renders the whole body defective. And the soul is of such a nature that it has no relation to extension, or to the dimensions or other properties of the matter of which the body is composed: it is related solely to the whole assemblage of the body's organs. This is obvious from our inability to conceive of a half or a third of a soul, or of the extension which a soul 351

occupies. Nor does the soul become any smaller if we cut off some part of the body, but it becomes completely separate from the body when we break up the assemblage of the body's organs.

31. *There is a little gland¹ in the brain where the soul exercises its functions more particularly than in the other parts of the body*

352 We need to recognize also that although the soul is joined to the whole body, nevertheless there is a certain part of the body where it exercises its functions more particularly than in all the others. It is commonly held that this part is the brain, or perhaps the heart – the brain because the sense organs are related to it, and the heart because we feel the passions as if they were in it. But on carefully examining the matter I think I have clearly established that the part of the body in which the soul directly exercises its functions is not the heart at all, or the whole of the brain. It is rather the innermost part of the brain, which is a certain very small gland situated in the middle of the brain's substance and suspended above the passage through which the spirits in the brain's anterior cavities communicate with those in its posterior cavities. The slightest movements on the part of this gland may alter very greatly the course of these spirits, and conversely any change, however slight, taking place in the course of the spirits may do much to change the movements of the gland.

32. *How we know that this gland is the principal seat of the soul*

353 Apart from this gland, there cannot be any other place in the whole body where the soul directly exercises its functions. I am convinced of this by the observation that all the other parts of our brain are double, as also are all the organs of our external senses – eyes, hands, ears and so on. But in so far as we have only one simple thought about a given object at any one time, there must necessarily be some place where the two images coming through the two eyes, or the two impressions coming from a single object through the double organs of any other sense, can come together in a single image or impression before reaching the soul, so that they do not present to it two objects instead of one. We can easily understand that these images or other impressions are unified in this gland by means of the spirits which fill the cavities of the brain. But they cannot exist united in this way in any other place in the body except as a result of their being united in this gland.

33. *The seat of the passions is not in the heart*

As for the opinion of those who think that the soul receives its passions in the heart, this is not worth serious consideration, since it is based solely on the fact that the passions make us feel some change in the heart. It is

¹ The pineal gland; see *Treatise on Man*, p. 100 above.

easy to see that the only reason why this change is felt as occurring in the heart is that there is a small nerve which descends to it from the brain – just as pain is felt as in the foot by means of the nerves in the foot, and the stars are perceived as in the sky by means of their light and the optic nerves. Thus it is no more necessary that our soul should exercise its functions directly in the heart in order to feel its passions there, than that it should be in the sky in order to see the stars there. 354

34. *How the soul and the body act on each other*

Let us therefore take it that the soul has its principal seat in the small gland located in the middle of the brain. From there it radiates through the rest of the body by means of the animal spirits, the nerves, and even the blood, which can take on the impressions of the spirits and carry them through the arteries to all the limbs. Let us recall what we said previously about the mechanism of our body. The nerve-fibres are so distributed in all the parts of the body that when the objects of the senses produce various different movements in these parts, the fibres are occasioned to open the pores of the brain in various different ways. This, in turn, causes the animal spirits contained in these cavities to enter the muscles in various different ways. In this manner the spirits can move the limbs in all the different ways they are capable of being moved. And all the other causes that can move the spirits in different ways are sufficient to direct them into different muscles. To this we may now add that the small gland which is the principal seat of the soul is suspended within the cavities containing these spirits, so that it can be moved by them in as many different ways as there are perceptible differences in the objects. But it can also be moved in various different ways by the soul, whose nature is such that it receives as many different impressions – that is, it has as many different perceptions as there occur different movements in this gland. And conversely, the mechanism of our body is so constructed that simply by this gland's being moved in any way by the soul or by any other cause, it drives the surrounding spirits towards the pores of the brain, which direct them through the nerves to the muscles; and in this way the gland makes the spirits move the limbs. 355

35. *Example of the way in which the impressions of objects are united in the gland in the middle of the brain*

Thus, for example, if we see some animal approaching us, the light reflected from its body forms two images, one in each of our eyes; and these images form two others, by means of the optic nerves, on the internal surface of the brain facing its cavities. Then, by means of the spirits that fill these cavities, the images radiate towards the little gland which the spirits surround: the movement forming each point of one of

- 356 the images tends towards the same point on the gland as the movement forming the corresponding point of the other image, which represents the same part of the animal. In this way, the two images in the brain form only one image on the gland, which acts directly upon the soul and makes it see the shape of the animal.

36. *Example of the way in which the passions are aroused in the soul*

- If, in addition, this shape is very strange and terrifying – that is, if it has a close relation to things which have previously been harmful to the body – this arouses the passion of anxiety in the soul, and then that of courage or perhaps fear and terror, depending upon the particular temperament of the body or the strength of the soul, and upon whether we have protected ourselves previously by defence or by flight against the harmful things to which the present impression is related. Thus in certain persons these factors dispose their brain in such a way that some of the spirits reflected from the image formed on the gland proceed from there to the nerves which serve to turn the back and move the legs in order to flee. The rest of the spirits go to nerves which expand or constrict the orifices of the heart, or else to nerves which agitate other parts of the body from which blood is sent to the heart, so that the blood is rarefied in a different
 357 manner from usual and spirits are sent to the brain which are adapted for maintaining and strengthening the passion of fear – that is, for holding open or re-opening the pores of the brain which direct the spirits into these same nerves. For merely by entering into these pores they produce in the gland a particular movement which is ordained by nature to make the soul feel this passion. And since these pores are related mainly to the little nerves which serve to contract or expand the orifices of the heart, this makes the soul feel the passion chiefly as if it were in the heart.

37. *How all the passions appear to be caused by some movement of the spirits*

Something similar happens with all the other passions. That is, they are caused chiefly by the spirits contained in the cavities of the brain making their way to nerves which serve to expand or constrict the orifices of the heart, or to drive blood towards the heart in a distinctive way from other parts of the body, or to maintain the passion in some other way. This makes it clear why I included in my definition of the passions that they are caused by some particular movement of the spirits.

- 358 38. *Example of movements of the body which accompany the passions and do not depend on the soul*

Moreover, just as the course which the spirits take to the nerves of the heart suffices to induce a movement in the gland through which fear

enters the soul, so too the mere fact that some spirits at the same time proceed to the nerves which serve to move the legs in flight causes another movement in the gland through which the soul feels and perceives this action. In this way, then, the body may be moved to take flight by the mere disposition of the organs, without any contribution from the soul.

39. How one and the same cause may excite different passions in different people

The same impression which the presence of a terrifying object forms on the gland, and which causes fear in some people, may excite courage and boldness in others. The reason for this is that brains are not all constituted in the same way. Thus the very same movement of the gland which in some excites fear, in others causes the spirits to enter the pores of the brain which direct them partly into nerves which serve to move the hands in self-defence and partly into those which agitate the blood and drive it towards the heart in the manner required to produce spirits appropriate for continuing this defence and for maintaining the will to do so.

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40. The principal effect of the passions

For it must be observed that the principal effect of all the human passions is that they move and dispose the soul to want the things for which they prepare the body. Thus the feeling of fear moves the soul to want to flee, that of courage to want to fight, and similarly with the others.

41. The power of the soul with respect to the body

But the will is by its nature so free that it can never be constrained. Of the two kinds of thought I have distinguished in the soul – the first its actions, i.e. its volitions, and the second its passions, taking this word in its most general sense to include every kind of perception – the former are absolutely within its power and can be changed only indirectly by the body, whereas the latter are absolutely dependent on the actions which produce them, and can be changed by the soul only indirectly, except when it is itself their cause. And the activity of the soul consists entirely in the fact that simply by willing something it brings it about that the little gland to which it is closely joined moves in the manner required to produce the effect corresponding to this volition.

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42. How we find in our memory the things we want to remember

Thus, when the soul wants to remember something, this volition makes the gland lean first to one side and then to another, thus driving the

spirits towards different regions of the brain until they come upon the one containing traces left by the object we want to remember. These traces consist simply in the fact that the pores of the brain through which the spirits previously made their way owing to the presence of this object have thereby become more apt than the others to be opened in the same way when the spirits again flow towards them. And so the spirits enter into these pores more easily when they come upon them, thereby producing in the gland that special movement which represents the same object to the soul, and makes it recognize the object as the one it wanted to remember.

361 43. *How the soul can imagine, be attentive, and move the body*

When we want to imagine something we have never seen, this volition has the power to make the gland move in the way required for driving the spirits towards the pores of the brain whose opening enables the thing to be represented. Again, when we want to fix our attention for some time on some particular object, this volition keeps the gland leaning in one particular direction during that time. And finally, when we want to walk or move our body in some other way, this volition makes the gland drive the spirits to the muscles which serve to bring about this effect.

44. *Each volition is naturally joined to some movement of the gland, but through effort or habit we may join it to others*

Yet our volition to produce some particular movement or other effect does not always result in our producing it; for that depends on the various ways in which nature or habit has joined certain movements of the gland to certain thoughts. For example, if we want to adjust our eyes
362 to look at a far-distant object, this volition causes the pupils to grow larger; and if we want to adjust them to look at a very near object, this volition makes the pupils contract. But if we think only of enlarging the pupils, we may indeed have such a volition, but we do not thereby enlarge them. For the movement of the gland, whereby the spirits are driven to the optic nerve in the way required for enlarging or contracting the pupils, has been joined by nature with the volition to look at distant or nearby objects, rather than with the volition to enlarge or contract the pupils. Again, when we speak, we think only of the meaning of what we want to say, and this makes us move our tongue and lips much more readily and effectively than if we thought of moving them in all the ways required for uttering the same words. For the habits acquired in learning to speak have made us join the action of the soul (which, by means of the gland, can move the tongue and lips) with the meaning of

the words which follow upon these movements, rather than with the movements themselves.

45. *The power of the soul with respect to its passions*

Our passions, too, cannot be directly aroused or suppressed by the action of our will, but only indirectly through the representation of things which are usually joined with the passions we wish to have and opposed to the passions we wish to reject. For example, in order to arouse boldness and suppress fear in ourselves, it is not sufficient to have the volition to do so. We must apply ourselves to consider the reasons, objects, or precedents which persuade us that the danger is not great; that there is always more security in defence than in flight; that we shall gain glory and joy if we conquer, whereas we can expect nothing but regret and shame if we flee; and so on. 363

46. *What prevents the soul from having full control over its passions*

There is one special reason why the soul cannot readily change or suspend its passions, which is what led me to say in my definition that the passions are not only caused but also maintained and strengthened by some particular movement of the spirits. The reason is that they are nearly all accompanied by some disturbance which takes place in the heart and consequently also throughout the blood and the animal spirits. Until this disturbance ceases they remain present to our mind in the same way as the objects of the senses are present to it while they are acting upon our sense organs. The soul can prevent itself from hearing a slight noise or feeling a slight pain by attending very closely to some other thing, but it cannot in the same way prevent itself from hearing thunder or feeling a fire that burns the hand. Likewise it can easily overcome the lesser passions, but not the stronger and more violent ones, except after the disturbance of the blood and spirits has died down. The most the will can do while this disturbance is at its full strength is not to yield to its effects and to inhibit many of the movements to which it disposes the body. For example, if anger causes the hand to rise to strike a blow, the will can usually restrain it; if fear moves the legs in flight, the will can stop them; and similarly in other cases. 364

47. *The conflicts that are usually supposed to occur between the lower part and the higher part of the soul*

All the conflicts usually supposed to occur between the lower part of the soul, which we call 'sensitive', and the higher or 'rational' part of the soul – or between the natural appetites and the will – consist simply in the

opposition between the movements which the body (by means of its spirits) and the soul (by means of its will) tend to produce at the same time in the gland. For there is within us but one soul, and this soul has within it no diversity of parts: it is at once sensitive and rational too, and all its appetites are volitions. It is an error to identify the different functions of the soul with persons who play different, usually mutually

365 opposed roles – an error which arises simply from our failure to distinguish properly the functions of the soul from those of the body. It is to the body alone that we should attribute everything that can be observed in us to oppose our reason. So there is no conflict here except in so far as the little gland in the middle of the brain can be pushed to one side by the soul and to the other side by the animal spirits (which, as I said above, are nothing but bodies), and these two impulses often happen to be opposed, the stronger cancelling the effect of the weaker. Now we may distinguish two kinds of movement produced in the gland by the spirits. Movements of the first kind represent to the soul the objects which stimulate the senses, or the impressions occurring in the brain; and these have no influence on the will. Movements of the second kind, which do have an influence on the will, cause the passions or the bodily movements which accompany the passions. As to the first, although they often hinder the actions of the soul, or are hindered by them, yet since they are not directly opposed to these actions, we observe no conflict between them. We observe conflict only between movements of the second kind and the volitions which oppose them – for example, between the force with which the spirits push the gland so as to cause the soul to desire something, and the force with which the soul, by its volition to avoid this thing, pushes the gland in a contrary direction. Such a conflict is revealed chiefly through the fact that the will, lacking the power to

366 produce the passions directly (as I have already said), is compelled to make an effort to consider a series of different things, and if one of them happens to have the power to change for a moment the course of the spirits, the next one may happen to lack this power, whereupon the spirits will immediately revert to the same course because no change has occurred in the state of the nerves, heart and blood. This makes the soul feel itself impelled, almost at one and the same time, to desire and not to desire one and the same thing; and that is why it has been thought that the soul has within it two conflicting powers. We may, however, acknowledge a kind of conflict, in so far as the same cause that produces a certain passion in the soul often also produces certain movements in the body, to which the soul makes no contribution and which the soul stops or tries to stop as soon as it perceives them. We experience this when an object that excites fear also causes the spirits to enter the muscles

which serve to move our legs in flight, while the will to be bold stops them from moving.

48. *How we recognize the strength or weakness of souls, and what is wrong with the weakest souls*

It is by success in these conflicts that each person can recognize the strength or weakness of his soul. For undoubtedly the strongest souls belong to those in whom the will by nature can most easily conquer the passions and stop the bodily movements which accompany them. But there are some who can never test the strength of their will because they never equip it to fight with its proper weapons, giving it instead only the weapons which some passions provide for resisting other passions. What I call its 'proper' weapons are firm and determinate judgements bearing upon the knowledge of good and evil, which the soul has resolved to follow in guiding its conduct. The weakest souls of all are those whose will is not determined in this way to follow such judgements, but constantly allows itself to be carried away by present passions. The latter, being often opposed to one another, pull the will first to one side and then to the other, thus making it battle against itself and so putting the soul in the most deplorable state possible. Thus, when fear represents death as an extreme evil which can be avoided only by flight, while ambition on the other hand depicts the dishonour of flight as an evil worse than death, these two passions jostle the will in opposite ways; and since the will obeys first the one and then the other, it is continually opposed to itself, and so it renders the soul enslaved and miserable.

49. *The strength of the soul is inadequate without knowledge of the truth*

It is true that very few people are so weak and irresolute that they choose only what their passion dictates. Most have some determinate judgements which they follow in regulating some of their actions. Often these judgements are false and based on passions by which the will has previously allowed itself to be conquered or led astray; but because the will continues to follow them when the passion which caused them is absent, they may be considered its proper weapons, and we may judge souls to be stronger or weaker according to their ability to follow these judgements more or less closely and resist the present passions which are opposed to them. There is, however, a great difference between the resolutions which proceed from some false opinion and those which are based solely on knowledge of the truth. For, anyone who follows the latter is assured of never regretting or repenting, whereas we always regret having followed the former when we discover our error.

50. *There is no soul so weak that it cannot, if well-directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions*

It is useful to note here, as already mentioned above,¹ that although nature seems to have joined every movement of the gland to certain of our thoughts from the beginning of our life, yet we may join them to others through habit. Experience shows this in the case of language.
 369 Words produce in the gland movements which are ordained by nature to represent to the soul only the sounds of their syllables when they are spoken or the shape of their letters when they are written, because we have acquired the habit of thinking of this meaning when we hear them spoken or see them written. It is also useful to note that although the movements (both of the gland and of the spirits and the brain) which represent certain objects to the soul are naturally joined to the movements which produce certain passions in it, yet through habit the former can be separated from the latter and joined to others which are very different. Indeed this habit can be acquired by a single action and does not require long practice. Thus, when we unexpectedly come upon something very foul in a dish we are eating with relish, our surprise may so change the disposition of our brain that we cannot afterwards look upon any such food without repulsion, whereas previously we ate it with pleasure. And the same may be observed in animals. For although they lack reason, and perhaps even thought, all the movements of the spirits and of the gland which produce passions in us are nevertheless present in them too, though in them they serve to maintain and strengthen only the
 370 movements of the nerves and the muscles which usually accompany the passions and not, as in us, the passions themselves. So when a dog sees a partridge, it is naturally disposed to run towards it; and when it hears a gun fired, the noise naturally impels it to run away. Nevertheless, setters are commonly trained so that the sight of a partridge makes them stop, and the noise they hear afterwards, when someone fires at the bird, makes them run towards it. These things are worth noting in order to encourage each of us to make a point of controlling our passions. For since we are able, with a little effort, to change the movements of the brain in animals devoid of reason, it is evident that we can do so still more effectively in the case of men. Even those who have the weakest souls could acquire absolute mastery over all their passions if we employed sufficient ingenuity in training and guiding them.

¹ Art. 44, p. 344 above.

PART TWO

The Number and Order of the Passions and explanation of the six primitive passions

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51. *The primary causes of the passions*

From what has been said above we know that the ultimate and most proximate cause of the passions of the soul is simply the agitation by which the spirits move the little gland in the middle of the brain. But this does not enable us to distinguish between the various passions: for that, we must investigate their origins and examine their first causes. They may sometimes be caused by an action of the soul when it sets itself to conceive some object or other, or by the mere temperament of the body or by the impressions which happen to be present in the brain, as when we feel sad or joyful without being able to say why. From what has been said, however, it appears that all such passions may also be excited by objects which stimulate the senses, and that these objects are their principal and most common causes. From this it follows that, in order to discover all the passions, it suffices to consider all the effects of these objects.

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52. *The function of the passions, and how they may be enumerated*

I observe, moreover, that the objects which stimulate the senses do not excite different passions in us because of differences in the objects, but only because of the various ways in which they may harm or benefit us, or in general have importance for us. The function of all the passions consists solely in this, that they dispose our soul to want the things which nature deems useful for us, and to persist in this volition; and the same agitation of the spirits which normally causes the passions also disposes the body to make movements which help us to attain these things. That is why an enumeration of the passions requires only an orderly examination of all the various ways having importance for us in which our senses can be stimulated by their objects. And I shall now enumerate all the principal passions according to the order in which they may thus be found.

53. *Wonder*

When our first encounter with some object surprises us and we find it novel, or very different from what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it ought to be, this causes us to wonder and to be astonished at it. Since all this may happen before we know whether or not the object is beneficial to us, I regard wonder as the first of all the passions. It has no opposite, for, if the object before us has no characteristics that surprise us, we are not moved by it at all and we consider it without passion.

54. *Esteem and contempt, generosity or pride, and humility or abjectness*

Wonder is joined to either esteem or contempt, depending on whether we wonder at the value of an object or at its insignificance. Thus we may
374 have esteem or contempt for ourselves; this gives rise to the passions of magnanimity or vanity and humility or abjectness, and then to the corresponding habits.

55. *Veneration and scorn*

But when our esteem or contempt is directed upon some other object that we regard as a free cause capable of doing good and evil, esteem becomes veneration and simple contempt becomes scorn.

56. *Love and hatred*

All the preceding passions may be produced in us without our perceiving in any way whether the object causing them is good or evil. But when we think of something as good with regard to us, i.e. as beneficial to us, this makes us have love for it; and when we think of it as evil or harmful, this arouses hatred in us.

57. *Desire*

This same consideration of good and evil is the origin of all the other passions. But in order to put them in order I shall take time into account;
375 and seeing that they lead us to look much more to the future than to the present or the past, I begin with desire. For it is obvious that this passion always concerns the future. This holds in every case involving desire – not only when we desire to acquire a good which we do not yet possess or to avoid an evil which we judge may occur, but also when we merely wish for the preservation of a good or the absence of an evil.

58. *Hope, anxiety, jealousy, confidence and despair*

We are prompted to desire the acquisition of a good or the avoidance of an evil simply if we think it possible to acquire the good or avoid the evil.

But when we go beyond this and consider whether there is much or little prospect of our getting what we desire, then whatever points to the former excites hope in us, and whatever points to the latter excites anxiety (of which jealousy is one variety). When hope is extreme, it changes its nature and is called 'confidence' or 'assurance' just as, on the other hand, extreme anxiety becomes despair.

59. *Irresolution, courage, boldness, emulation, timidity and terror*

Thus we may hope and fear, even though the expected outcome does not depend on us at all. But when we think of it as dependent on us we may have some difficulty in deciding upon the means or in putting them into effect. The first difficulty gives rise to irresolution, which makes us disposed to deliberate and take advice; the second is opposed by courage or boldness, of which emulation is one variety. And timidity is contrary to courage, as fear or terror is to boldness. 376

60. *Remorse*

If we decide upon some course of action before the irresolution has ceased, this causes remorse of conscience to arise. Unlike the preceding passions, remorse does not concern the time to come, but rather the present or the past.

61. *Joy and sadness*

Consideration of a present good arouses joy in us, and consideration of a present evil arouses sadness, when the good or evil is one that we regard as belonging to us.

62. *Derision, envy, pity*

But when we think of the good or evil as belonging to other people, we may judge them worthy or unworthy of it. When we judge them worthy of it, that arouses in us solely the passion of joy, in so far as we get some benefit from seeing things happen as they ought; and the joy aroused in the case of a good differs from that aroused in the case of an evil only in that the former is serious whereas the latter is accompanied by laughter and derision. But if we judge the others unworthy of the good or evil, in the former case envy is aroused and in the latter case pity – envy and pity being species of sadness. And it should be observed that the same passions which relate to present goods or evils may often also be related to those which are yet to come, in so far as we think of a good or evil as if it were present when we judge that it will come about. 377

63. *Self-satisfaction and repentance*

We may also consider the cause of a good or evil, present as well as past. A good done by ourselves gives us an internal satisfaction, which is the

sweetest of all the passions, whereas an evil produces repentance, which is the most bitter.

64. *Favour and gratitude*

- 378 But a good done by others causes us to regard them with favour, even if it was not done to us; and if it was done to us then we join gratitude to the favour.

65. *Indignation and anger*

In the same way, an evil done by others and having no relation to us merely causes us to feel indignation towards them; and when it is related to us, it stirs up anger as well.

66. *Pride and shame*

Further, a good or evil which is in us, or which has been in us, produces pride or shame respectively, when it is related to the opinion which others may have of it.

67. *Disgust, regret and cheerfulness*

Sometimes the persistence of the good causes boredom or disgust, whereas that of the evil diminishes sadness. Finally, a past good gives rise to regret, which is a kind of sadness; and a past evil gives rise to cheerfulness, which is a kind of joy.

- 379 68. *Why this enumeration of the passions differs from the one commonly accepted*

This order seems to me the best for an enumeration of the passions. I am well aware that here I part company with the opinion of all who have written previously about the passions. But I do so for good reason. For they derive their enumeration from a distinction they draw, within the sensitive part of the soul, between the two appetites they call 'concupiscible' and 'irascible'.¹ As I have said already, I recognize no distinction of parts within the soul; so I think their distinction amounts merely to saying that the soul has two powers, one of desire and the other of anger. But since the soul has in the same way the powers of wonder, love, hope and anxiety, and hence the power to receive in itself every other passion, or to perform the actions to which the passions impel it, I do not see why they have chosen to refer them all to desire or to anger. And besides, their enumeration does not include all the principal passions, as I believe mine does. I speak only of the principal passions, because we might still

¹ A distinction based on that made by Plato, in Book IV of the *Republic*, between the 'irascible' and 'concupiscent' parts of the soul.

distinguish many other more specific ones – indeed an unlimited number of them.

69. *There are only six primitive passions*

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But the number of those which are simple and primitive is not very large. Indeed, in reviewing all those I have enumerated, we can easily see that there are only six of this kind – namely, wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. All the others are either composed from some of these six or they are species of them. That is why, to ensure that readers are not confused by the multiplicity of the passions, I shall treat the six primitive passions separately, and then I shall show how all the others originate in them.

70. *Wonder: its definition and cause*

Wonder is a sudden surprise of the soul which brings it to consider with attention the objects that seem to it unusual and extraordinary. It has two causes: first, an impression in the brain, which represents the object as something unusual and consequently worthy of special consideration; and secondly, a movement of the spirits, which the impression disposes both to flow with great force to the place in the brain where it is located so as to strengthen and preserve it there, and also to pass into the muscles which serve to keep the sense organs fixed in the same orientation so that they will continue to maintain the impression in the way in which they formed it.

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71. *In this passion there occurs no change in the heart or in the blood*

It is a peculiarity of this passion that we do not find it accompanied by any change in the heart or in the blood, such as occurs in the case of the other passions. The reason for this is that it has as its object not good or evil, but only knowledge of the thing that we wonder at. Hence it has no relation with the heart and blood, on which depends the whole well-being of our body, but only with the brain, in which are located the organs of the senses used in gaining this knowledge.

72. *What the strength of wonder consists in*

This does not prevent it from having considerable strength because of the element of surprise, i.e. the sudden and unexpected arrival of the impression which changes the movement of the spirits. Such surprise is proper and peculiar to this passion, so that when it is found in the other passions – and it normally occurs in and augments almost all of them – this is because wonder is joined with them. Its strength depends on two things: the novelty and the fact that the movement it causes is at full

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strength right from the start. For it is certain that such a movement has more effect than one which, being weak initially and increasing only gradually, may easily be diverted. It is also certain that objects of the senses that are novel affect the brain in certain parts where it is not normally affected; and that since these parts are more tender or less firm than those hardened through frequent agitation, the effects of the movements produced in them are thereby increased. You will find this all the more plausible if you consider that something similar accounts for the fact that in walking we have very little feeling of any contact in our feet, since the weight of our body has accustomed the soles of our feet to a contact that is quite hard; whereas when someone tickles our feet, although the contact is much lighter and gentler, we find this almost unbearable simply because it is not part of our ordinary experience.

73. *What astonishment is*

- 383 This element of surprise causes the spirits in the cavities of the brain to make their way to the place where the impression of the object of wonder is located. It has so much power to do this that sometimes it drives all the spirits there, and makes them so wholly occupied with the preservation of this impression that none of them pass thence into the muscles or even depart from the tracks they originally followed in the brain. As a result the whole body remains as immobile as a statue, making it possible for only the side of the object originally presented to be perceived, and hence impossible for a more detailed knowledge of the object to be acquired. This is what we commonly call 'being astonished'. Astonishment is an excess of wonder, and it can never be other than bad.

74. *How the passions are useful, and how they are harmful*

From what has been said it is easy to recognize that the utility of all the passions consists simply in the fact that they strengthen and prolong thoughts in the soul which it is good for the soul to preserve and which otherwise might easily be erased from it. Likewise the harm they may cause consists entirely in their strengthening and preserving these thoughts beyond what is required, or in their strengthening and preserving others on which it is not good to dwell.

384 75. *How wonder, in particular, is useful*

Of wonder, in particular, we may say that it is useful in that it makes us learn and retain in our memory things of which we were previously ignorant. For we wonder only at what appears to us unusual and extraordinary; and something can appear so only because we have been ignorant of it, or perhaps because it differs from things we have known

(this difference being what makes us call it 'extraordinary'). But when something previously unknown to us comes before our intellect or our senses for the first time, this does not make us retain it in our memory unless our idea of it is strengthened in our brain by some passion, or perhaps also by an application of our intellect as fixed by our will in a special state of attention and reflection. The other passions may serve to make us take note of things which appear good or evil, but we feel only wonder at things which merely appear unusual. So we see that people who are not naturally inclined to wonder are usually very ignorant.

76. *In what ways it can be harmful, and how we can make good its deficiency and correct its excess* 385

But more often we wonder too much rather than too little, as when we are astonished in looking at things which merit little or no consideration. This may entirely prevent or pervert the use of reason. Therefore, although it is good to be born with some inclination to wonder, since it makes us disposed to acquire scientific knowledge, yet after acquiring such knowledge we must attempt to free ourselves from this inclination as much as possible. For we may easily make good its absence through that special state of reflection and attention which our will can always impose upon our understanding when we judge the matter before us to be worth serious consideration. But there is no remedy for excessive wonder except to acquire the knowledge of many things and to practise examining all those which may seem most unusual and strange.

77. *It is not the most stupid or clever people who are most carried away by wonder*

Moreover, although it is only the dull and stupid who are not naturally disposed to wonder, this does not mean that those with the best minds are always the most inclined to it. In fact those most inclined to it are chiefly people who, though equipped with excellent common sense, have no high opinion of their abilities. 386

78. *Excessive wonder may become a habit when we fail to correct it*

This passion seems to diminish with use, for the more we encounter unusual things which we wonder at, the more we find ourselves accustomed to stop wondering at them and to regard any we subsequently come upon as common. Nevertheless, when it is excessive and makes us fix our attention solely on the first image of the objects before us without acquiring any further knowledge about them, it leaves behind a habit which makes the soul disposed to dwell in the same way on every other object coming before it which appears at all novel. This is what

prolongs the troubles of those afflicted with blind curiosity, i.e. those who seek out rarities simply in order to wonder at them and not in order to know them. For gradually they become so full of wonder that things of no importance are no less apt to arrest their attention than those whose investigation is more useful.

387 79. *The definitions of love and hatred*

Love is an emotion of the soul caused by a movement of the spirits, which impels the soul to join itself willingly to objects that appear to be agreeable to it. And hatred is an emotion caused by the spirits, which impels the soul to want to be separated from objects which are presented to it as harmful. I say that these emotions are caused by the spirits not only in order to distinguish love and hatred (which are passions and depend on the body) from judgements which also bring the soul to join itself willingly to things it deems bad, but also to distinguish them from the emotions which these judgements produce in the soul.

80. *What it is to join or separate oneself willingly*

Moreover, in using the word 'willingly' I am not speaking of desire, which is a completely separate passion relating to the future. I mean rather the assent by which we consider ourselves henceforth as joined with what we love in such a manner that we imagine a whole, of which we take ourselves to be only one part, and the thing loved to be the other. In the case of hatred, on the other hand, we consider ourselves alone as a whole entirely separated from the thing for which we have an aversion.

388 81. *The distinction usually made between concupiscent love and benevolent love*

A distinction is commonly made between two sorts of love, one called 'benevolent love', which prompts us to wish for the well-being of what we love, and the other called 'concupiscent love', which makes us desire the things we love. But it seems to me that this distinction concerns only the effects of love and not its essence. For as soon as we have joined ourselves willingly to some object, whatever its nature may be, we feel benevolent towards it – that is, we also join to it willingly the things we believe to be agreeable to it: this is one of the principal effects of love. And if we judge that it would be beneficial to possess an object or to be associated with it in some manner other than willingly, then we desire it: and this, too, is one of the most common effects of love.

82. *How very different passions agree in that they partake of love*

Nor do we need to distinguish as many kinds of love as there are different

possible objects of love. Consider, for example, the passions which an ambitious man has for glory, a miser for money, a drunkard for wine, a brutish man for a woman he wants to violate, an honourable man for his friend or mistress, and a good father for his children. Although very different from one another, these passions are similar in so far as they all partake of love. But the men in the first four examples have love only for the possession of the objects to which their passion is related, and not for the objects themselves: for these objects they have merely desire mingled with other particular passions. Whereas the love of a good father for his children is so pure that he desires to have nothing from them, and he wants neither to possess them otherwise than he does, nor to be joined to them more closely than he already is. He regards them, rather, as other parts of himself, and seeks their good as he does his own, or even more assiduously. For he imagines that he and they together form a whole of which he is not the better part, and so he often puts their interests before his own and is not afraid of sacrificing himself in order to save them. The affection which an honourable man has for his friends is of the same nature, though it is rarely so perfect; and the affection he has for his mistress partakes largely of love, but also a little of desire. 389

83. *The difference between simple affection, friendship and devotion*

We may, I think, more reasonably distinguish kinds of love according to the esteem which we have for the object we love, as compared with ourselves. For when we have less esteem for it than for ourselves, we have only a simple affection for it; when we esteem it equally with ourselves, that is called 'friendship'; and when we have more esteem for it, our passion may be called 'devotion'. Thus, we may have affection for a flower, a bird, or a horse; but unless our mind is very disordered, we can have friendship only for persons. They are so truly the objects of this passion that there is no person so imperfect that we could not have for him a very perfect friendship, given that we believe ourselves loved by him and that we have a truly noble and generous soul (in accordance with the explanation given below in articles 154 and 156). As for devotion, its principal object is undoubtedly the supreme Deity, for whom we cannot fail to have devotion when we know him as we ought. But we may also have devotion for our sovereign, our country, our town, and even for a particular person when we have much more esteem for him than for ourselves. The difference between these three kinds of love is revealed chiefly by their effects. For in all of them we consider ourselves as joined and united to the thing loved, and so we are always ready to abandon the lesser part of the whole that we compose with it so as to preserve the other part. In the case of simple affection this results in our 390

always preferring ourselves to the object of our love. In the case of devotion, on the other hand, we prefer the thing loved so strongly that we
 391 are not afraid to die in order to preserve it. We have often seen examples of such devotion in those who have exposed themselves to certain death in defence of their sovereign or their city, or sometimes even for particular persons to whom they were devoted.

84. *There are not so many kinds of hatred as of love*

Moreover, although hatred is directly opposed to love, we do not distinguish it into as many kinds because the evils from which we are separated willingly do not differ so noticeably from one another as do the goods to which we are joined willingly.

85. *Attraction and repulsion*

I find only one important distinction which is similar in both love and hatred. It consists in the fact that the objects both of love and of hatred may be represented to the soul either by the external senses, or by the internal senses and its own reason. For we commonly call something 'good' or 'evil' if our internal senses or our reason make us judge it agreeable or contrary to our nature. But we call something 'beautiful' or 'ugly' if it is represented as such by our external senses (chiefly by the
 392 sense of sight, of which we take more notice than of all the others). Two kinds of love arise from this, namely the love we have for good things and the love we have for beautiful things. To the latter we may give the name 'attraction', so as not to confuse it with the former or with desire (to which we often give the name 'love'). Two kinds of hatred arise in the same way, one relating to evil things and the other to things that are ugly; and the latter may be called 'repulsion' or 'aversion', so as to set it apart. But what is most noteworthy here is that the passions of attraction and repulsion are usually more violent than the other kinds of love and hatred, because what enters the soul through the senses affects it more strongly than what is represented to it by its reason. At the same time, these passions usually contain less truth than the others. Consequently they are the most deceptive of all the passions, and the ones against which we must guard ourselves most carefully.

86. *The definition of desire*

The passion of desire is an agitation of the soul caused by the spirits, which disposes the soul to wish, in the future, for the things it represents to itself as agreeable. Thus we desire not only the presence of goods which are absent but also the preservation of those which are present. In

addition we desire the absence of evils, both those that already affect us and those we believe we may suffer on some future occasion.

87. *Desire is a passion which has no opposite*

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I am well aware that in the Schools they commonly contrast the passion which leads to the search for good with that which leads to the avoidance of evil, calling the former alone 'desire' and the latter 'aversion'. But there is no good whose privation is not an evil, and no evil (considered as a positive thing) whose privation is not a good. In pursuing riches, for example, we necessarily avoid poverty, while in avoiding illness we pursue health, and likewise in other cases. Thus I think it is always one and the same movement which gives rise to the pursuit of a good and at the same time the avoidance of the opposite evil. I note only this difference, that the desire we have when we are led towards some good is accompanied by love, and then by hope and joy, whereas when we are led to get away from the evil opposed to this good, the same desire is accompanied by hatred, anxiety and sadness (which causes us to judge the evil inimical to ourselves). But if we wish to consider the desire when it relates at the same time both to the pursuit of some good and equally to the avoidance of the opposed evil, we can see very clearly that a single passion brings about both the one and the other.

88. *The various kinds of desire*

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It would be more reasonable to distinguish desire into as many different species as there are different objects that we pursue. Curiosity, for example, is nothing but a desire for knowledge, and it differs greatly from a desire for glory, as the latter differs from a desire for vengeance, and likewise for other desires. But it is sufficient to note here that there are as many species of desire as of love or hatred, and that the most important and strongest desires are those which arise from attraction and repulsion.

89. *The desire which arises from repulsion*

Now although, as already mentioned, it is one and the same desire which leads to the pursuit of a good and to the avoidance of the opposite evil, yet the desire which arises from attraction is very different from that which arises from repulsion. For attraction and repulsion, which are indeed opposites, are not the good and the evil which serve as objects of these desires. Rather, they are simply two emotions of the soul which dispose it to pursue two very different things. On the one hand, repulsion is ordained by nature to represent to the soul a sudden and unexpected death. Thus, although it is sometimes merely the touch of an earthworm,

395 the sound of a rustling leaf, or our shadow that gives rise to repulsion, we feel at once as much emotion as if we had experienced a threat of certain death. This produces a sudden agitation which leads the soul to do its utmost to avoid so manifest an evil. It is this kind of desire that we commonly call 'avoidance' or 'aversion'.

90. *The desire which arises from attraction*

Attraction, on the other hand, is specially ordained by nature to represent the enjoyment of that which attracts us as the greatest of all the goods belonging to mankind, and so to make us have a burning desire for this enjoyment. It is true that there are different sorts of attraction, and that the desires arising from them are not all equally powerful. Thus, for example, the beauty of flowers moves us only to look at them, and that of fruits to eat them. But the principal attraction comes from the perfections we imagine in a person who we think capable of becoming a second self. For nature has established a difference of sex in human beings, as in animals lacking reason, and with this she has also implanted certain impressions in the brain which bring it about that at a certain age and time we regard ourselves as deficient – as forming only one half of a whole, whose other half must be a person of the opposite sex. In this way
 396 nature represents, in a confused manner, the acquisition of this other half as the greatest of all goods imaginable. Although we see many persons of the opposite sex, yet we do not desire many at any one time, since nature does not make us imagine that we need more than one other half. But when we observe something in one of them which is more attractive than anything we observe at that moment in the others, this determines our soul to feel towards that one alone all the inclination which nature gives it to pursue the good which it represents as the greatest we could possibly possess. The name 'love' is applied more often to the inclination or desire which arises in this way from attraction than to the passion of love described previously. Having stranger effects than the passion, this inclination or desire provides writers of romances and poets with their principal subject-matter.

91. *The definition of joy*

Joy is a pleasant emotion which the soul has when it enjoys a good which impressions in the brain represent to it as its own. I say that the soul has this emotion when it enjoys a good, for in fact the soul receives no other benefit from all the goods it possesses; and as long as it derives no joy from them, we may say that it does not enjoy them any more than it
 397 would if it did not possess them at all. I add that the good is one which impressions in the brain represent as the soul's own, so as not to confuse

this joy, which is a passion, with the purely intellectual joy that arises in the soul through an action of the soul alone. The latter may be said to be a pleasant emotion which the soul arouses in itself whenever it enjoys a good which its understanding represents to it as its own. Of course, while the soul is joined to the body, this intellectual joy can scarcely fail to be accompanied by the joy which is a passion. For as soon as our intellect perceives that we possess some good, even one so different from anything belonging to the body as to be wholly unimaginable, the imagination cannot fail immediately to form some impression in the brain, from which there ensues the movement of the spirits which produces the passion of joy.

92. *The definition of sadness*

Sadness is an unpleasant listlessness which affects the soul when it suffers discomfort from an evil or deficiency which impressions in the brain represent to it as its own. There is also an intellectual sadness which, though not the passion, rarely fails to be accompanied by it.

93. *The causes of these two passions*

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When intellectual joy or sadness arouses the corresponding passion, its cause is quite obvious. For we see from the definitions that joy results from the belief that we possess some good, and sadness from the belief that we have some evil or deficiency. But it often happens that we feel sad or joyful without being able to observe so distinctly the good or evil which causes this feeling. This happens when the good or evil forms its impression in the brain without the intervention of the soul, sometimes because it affects only the body and sometimes because, even though it affects the soul, the soul does not consider it as good or evil but views it under some other form whose impression is joined in the brain with that of the good or evil.

94. *How these passions are aroused by goods and evils which concern solely the body; and what titillation and pain consist in*

Thus, when we are in good health and things are calmer than usual, we feel in ourselves a cheerfulness which results not from any operation of the understanding but solely from impressions formed in the brain by the movement of the spirits. And we feel sad in the same way when our body is indisposed even though we do not know that it is. Indeed, titillation of the senses is followed so closely by joy, and pain by sadness, that most people make no distinction between the two. Nevertheless they differ so markedly that we may sometimes suffer pains with joy, and receive titillating sensations which displease us. But what makes joy ordinarily

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follow titillation is the fact that what we call 'titillation' or 'pleasurable sensation' occurs when the objects of the senses produce some movement in the nerves which would be capable of harming them if they did not have enough strength to resist it or if the body was not in a healthy condition. This forms an impression in the brain which, being ordained by nature to bear witness to the body's healthy condition and strength, represents this to the soul as a good which belongs to it in so far as it is united with the body; and so this impression produces joy in the soul. For almost the same reason we naturally take pleasure in feeling ourselves aroused to all sorts of passions – even to sadness and hatred – when these passions are caused merely by the strange happenings we see presented on the stage, or by other such things which, being incapable of harming us in any way, seem to affect our soul by titillating it. And pain usually produces sadness because the sensation we call 'pain' always results from
 400 an action so violent that it injures the nerves. This sensation, ordained by nature to indicate to the soul the bodily damage suffered from such an action, and the body's feeble inability to withstand it, represents both as evils which are always unpleasant to the soul except when they cause some goods which the soul values more highly.

95. *How they may also be aroused by goods and evils which the soul does not notice even though they belong to it, such as the pleasure derived from taking risks or from recollecting past evils*

Young people often take pleasure in attempting difficult tasks and exposing themselves to great dangers even though they do not hope thereby to gain any profit or glory. This pleasure arises in the following way. The thought that the undertaking is difficult forms an impression in their brain which, when joined with the impression they could form if they were to think that it is a good thing to feel sufficiently courageous, happy, skilful, or strong to dare to take such risks, causes them to take pleasure in doing so. And the satisfaction which old people feel in recollecting the evils they have suffered results from their thinking that it is a good thing to have been able to survive in spite of them.

401 96. *The movements of the blood and the spirits which cause the five preceding passions*

The five passions I have begun to explain here are joined or opposed to one another to such an extent that it is easier to consider them all together than to treat each of them separately, as we treated wonder. Unlike the cause of wonder, which is located in the brain alone, their cause is located also in the heart, the spleen, the liver and all the other parts of the body, in so far as they help to produce the blood and hence

the spirits. For, although all the veins conduct the blood to the heart, it sometimes happens that the blood in some veins is driven there with greater force than the blood in other veins; and it also happens that the openings through which the blood enters or leaves the heart are enlarged or contracted to a greater extent at one time than at another.

97. *The chief experiences which enable us to know these movements in the case of love*

In considering the various alterations which experience reveals in our body during the time our soul is agitated by different passions, I observe in the case of love that when it occurs on its own – that is, unaccompanied 402 by any strong joy, desire, or sadness – the pulse has a regular beat, but is much fuller and stronger than normal; we feel a gentle heat in the chest; and the digestion of food takes place very quickly in the stomach. In this way this passion is conducive to good health.

98. *In hatred*

I observe in the case of hatred, on the other hand, that the pulse is irregular, weaker and often quicker; we feel chills mingled with a sort of sharp, piercing heat in the chest; and the stomach ceases to perform its function, being inclined to regurgitate and reject the food we have eaten, or at any rate to spoil it and turn it into bad humours.

99. *In joy*

In joy, the pulse is regular and faster than normal, but not so strong or full as in the case of love; we feel a pleasant heat not only in the chest but also spreading into all the external parts of the body along with the blood 403 which is seen to flow copiously to these parts; and yet we sometimes lose our appetite because our digestion is less active than usual.

100. *In sadness*

In sadness the pulse is weak and slow, and we feel as if our heart had tight bonds around it, and were frozen by icicles which transmit their cold to the rest of the body. But sometimes we still have a good appetite and feel our stomach continuing to do its duty, provided there is no hatred mixed with the sadness.

101. *In desire*

Lastly, I note this special feature of desire, that it agitates the heart more violently than any other passion, and supplies more spirits to the brain. Passing from there into the muscles, these spirits render all the senses more acute, and all the parts of the body more mobile.

102. *The movement of the blood and the spirits in the case of love*

These observations, and many others that would take too long to report,
 404 have led me to conclude that when the understanding thinks of some
 object of love, this thought forms an impression in the brain which
 directs the animal spirits through the nerves of the sixth pair to the
 muscles surrounding the intestines and stomach, where they act in such a
 way that the alimentary juices (which are changing into new blood) flow
 rapidly to the heart without stopping in the liver.¹ Driven there with
 greater force than the blood from other parts of the body, these juices
 enter the heart in greater abundance and produce a stronger heat there
 because they are coarser than the blood which has already been rarefied
 many times as it passes again and again through the heart. As a result the
 spirits sent by the heart to the brain have parts which are coarser and
 more agitated than usual; and as they strengthen the impression formed
 by the first thought of the loved object, these spirits compel the soul to
 dwell upon this thought. This is what the passion of love consists in.

103. *In hatred*

In the case of hatred, on the other hand, at the first thought of the object
 that gives rise to aversion, the spirits in the brain are so directed to the
 muscles of the stomach and intestines that they constrict all the openings
 through which the alimentary juices normally flow, thus preventing these
 juices from mixing with the blood. This thought also directs the spirits to
 405 the little nerves of the spleen and the lower part of the liver (where the
 bile is collected) in such manner that the parts of blood which are
 normally returned to these organs issue from them and flow to the heart
 together with the blood which is in the branches of the *vena cava*. This
 causes the heat of the heart to be very uneven, in so far as the blood
 coming from the spleen is hardly heated and rarefied at all, whereas the
 blood coming from the lower part of the liver, where the gall is always
 located, boils up and expands very rapidly. In consequence the spirits
 going to the brain also have very unequal parts, and move very strangely.
 As a result they strengthen the ideas of hatred which are already
 imprinted there, and they dispose the soul to have thoughts which are full
 of acrimony and bitterness.

104. *In joy*

In joy, it is not the nerves of the spleen, liver, stomach, or intestines that
 are active, so much as those throughout the rest of the body. The nerve

1 Seven pairs of cranial nerves are recognized in Galenian physiology; the 'sixth pair' corresponds in modern physiology to the glossopharyngeal, vagus and spinal accessory nerves.

located around the orifices of the heart is especially active: by opening and enlarging these orifices it enables the blood which other nerves drive through the veins to enter and leave the heart in larger quantities than usual. And because the blood then entering the heart has come into the veins from the arteries, and so has passed through the heart many times already, it expands very readily and produces spirits whose parts, being very equal and fine, are suited for the formation and strengthening of the impressions in the brain which give to the soul thoughts that are cheerful and peaceful. 406

105. *In sadness*

In sadness, by contrast, the openings in the heart are severely restricted by the small nerve which surrounds them, and the blood in the veins is not agitated at all, so that very little of it goes to the heart. At the same time, the passages through which the alimentary juices flow from the stomach and intestines to the liver remain open, so that the appetite does not diminish, except when hatred, which is often joined to sadness, closes these passages.

106. *In desire*

Finally, the passion of desire has this special characteristic: the volition to acquire some good or avoid some evil sends the spirits rapidly from the brain to all the parts of the body which may help to bring about this effect, and especially to the heart and the parts which supply most of its blood. Receiving a greater amount of blood than usual, the heart sends a greater quantity of spirits to the brain, both in order to maintain and strengthen the idea of the volition and to pass from there into all the sense organs and all the muscles that can be used for obtaining what is desired. 407

107. *The cause of these movements in the case of love*

I derive an explanation for all this from what I said previously, namely that our soul and our body are so linked that once we have joined some bodily action with a certain thought, the one does not occur afterwards without the other occurring too. We see this, for example, in those who have taken some medicine with great aversion when they are ill, and cannot afterwards eat or drink anything approaching it in taste without immediately feeling the same aversion; and similarly they cannot think of the aversion they have for medicines without the same taste returning in their thought. For it seems to me that when our soul began to be joined to our body, its first passions must have arisen on some occasion when the blood, or some other juice entering the heart, was a more suitable fuel

than usual for maintaining the heat which is the principle of life. This caused the soul to join itself willingly to that fuel, i.e. to love it; and at the
 408 same time the spirits flowed from the brain to the muscles capable of pressing or agitating the parts of the body from which the fuel had come to the heart, so as to make them send more of it. These parts were the stomach and the intestines, whose agitation increases the appetite, or else the liver and the lungs, which the muscles of the diaphragm can press. That is why this same movement of the spirits has ever since accompanied the passion of love.

108. *In hatred*

Sometimes, on the other hand, there came to the heart a juice of an alien nature, which was unsuitable for maintaining the heat, or even was capable of extinguishing it. This caused the spirits rising from the heart to the brain to produce the passion of hatred in the soul. At the same time these spirits went from the brain to nerves capable of driving blood from the spleen and the minute veins of the liver to the heart so as to prevent this harmful juice from entering it; and they also went to nerves capable of driving this juice back to the intestines and stomach, or capable sometimes of making the stomach regurgitate it. As a result, these same movements usually accompany the passion of hatred. You can see with the naked eye that the liver contains a number of rather wide veins or ducts through which the alimentary juices can pass from the portal vein into the vena cava, and then to the heart, without ever stopping in the
 409 liver. But you can also see countless other, smaller veins where the juice might stop. These always contain blood in reserve, as does the spleen, and since this blood is coarser than that in the other parts of the body, it is better able to serve as a fuel for the fire in the heart when the stomach and intestines fail to supply any.

109. *In joy*

It has also sometimes happened at the beginning of our life that the blood contained in the veins was quite suitable for nourishing and maintaining the heat of the heart, and was so plentiful that the heart had no need for any other source of nourishment. This produced the passion of joy in the soul. At the same time it caused the orifices of the heart to be opened wider than usual; and it made the spirits flow abundantly from the brain not only into the nerves which serve to open these orifices but also generally into all the other nerves which drive the blood from the veins to the heart, thus preventing any fresh blood from coming into the heart from the liver, spleen, intestines and stomach. That is why these same movements accompany joy.

110. *In sadness*

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Sometimes, on the other hand, it has happened that the body has lacked nourishment, and this lack must have made the soul feel its first sadness (at any rate the first which was not joined to hatred). It also caused the orifices of the heart to contract because they received only a little blood; and it caused a rather significant proportion of this blood to come from the spleen, since this is, so to speak, the ultimate reservoir of blood for the heart when it does not get enough from elsewhere. That explains why sadness is always accompanied by movements of the spirits and nerves which serve in this way to restrict the orifices of the heart and to direct blood to it from the spleen.

111. *In desire*

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Lastly, when the soul was newly joined to the body, all its first desires must have been to accept things beneficial to it and to reject those harmful to it. It was to these same ends that the spirits began at that time to move all the muscles and sense organs in all the ways they can move them. That is the reason why now, when the soul desires anything, the whole body becomes more agile and ready to move than it normally is without any such desire. Moreover, when the body is in this condition, the desires of the soul are rendered stronger and keener.

112. *The external signs of these passions*

There is no need for me to pause to explain any further the differences in the pulse and all the other properties I have attributed to these passions, for I have said enough already to enable their causes to be understood. For each passion, however, I have noted solely what can be observed when it is the only one present, and what enables us to recognize the movements of the blood and spirits which produce it. I have yet to deal with the many external signs which usually accompany the passions – signs which are much better observed when several are mingled together, as they normally are, than when they are separated. The most important such signs are the expressions of the eyes and the face, changes in colour, trembling, listlessness, fainting, laughter, tears, groans and sighs.

113. *The expressions of the eyes and the face*

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There is no passion which some particular expression of the eyes does not reveal. For some passions this is quite obvious: even the most stupid servants can tell from their master's eye whether he is angry with them. But although it is easy to perceive such expressions of the eyes and to know what they signify, it is not easy to describe them. For each consists of many changes in the movement and shape of the eye, and these are so

special and slight that we cannot perceive each of them separately, though we can easily observe the result of their conjunction. Almost the same can be said of the facial expressions which also accompany passions. For although more extensive than those of the eyes, they are still hard to discern. They differ so little that some people make almost the same face when they weep as others do when they laugh. Of course, some facial expressions are quite noticeable, such as wrinkles in the forehead in anger and certain movements of the nose and lips in indignation and derision; but these seem not so much natural as voluntary. And in general the soul is able to change facial expressions, as well as expressions of the eyes, by vividly feigning a passion which is
 413 contrary to one it wishes to conceal. Thus we may use such expressions to hide our passions as well as to reveal them.

114. *Changes in colour*

We cannot so easily prevent ourselves from blushing or growing pale when some passion disposes us to do so. For these changes do not depend on the nerves and muscles as do the preceding ones: they proceed more immediately from the heart, which may be called the source of the passions in so far as it prepares the blood and the spirits to produce them. It is certain that the colour of the face comes solely from the blood which, flowing continually from the heart through the arteries into the veins and then back into the heart, colours the face more or less, depending on whether it fills the small veins located near its surface to a greater or lesser extent.

115. *How joy causes blushing*

Thus joy renders the colour brighter and rosier because it opens the valves of the heart and so causes the blood to flow more quickly in all the veins. As the blood becomes warmer and thinner it fills out all the parts of the face somewhat, thus making it look more cheerful and happier.

414 116. *How sadness causes pallor*

Sadness, on the other hand, constricts the orifices of the heart, causing the blood to flow more slowly in the veins and to become colder and thicker. Needing to occupy less space, the blood then withdraws into the largest veins, which are the nearest to the heart, leaving the more remote veins, such as those in the face; and since these are particularly conspicuous, the face is caused to appear pale and sunken. This happens chiefly when the sadness is great, or when it comes on suddenly, as in terror, when surprise amplifies the action which grips the heart.

117. *Why we often blush when we are sad*

But it often happens that we do not become pale when we are sad, and on the contrary we become flushed. This must be attributed to the other passions which are joined to sadness, namely love or desire, and sometimes also hatred. For when these passions heat or agitate the blood coming from the liver, intestines and other internal parts of the body, they drive it to the heart, and then through the great artery to the veins in the face. And the sadness which more or less closes the orifices of the heart cannot stop this blood except when it is quite profound. But even if it is only moderate, this sadness easily prevents the blood which has entered the veins of the face from descending to the heart, so long as love, desire, or hatred is driving other blood there from the internal parts. That is why the blood trapped in the face makes it red – indeed, redder than when we are joyful, since the colour of blood is all the more conspicuous when it flows less rapidly, and also because more blood can collect in the veins of the face when the orifices of the heart are opened less widely. We see this chiefly in shame, which is made up of self-love and an urgent desire to avoid present disgrace (which makes the blood come from the internal parts to the heart and then through the arteries to the face), together with a moderate sadness (which prevents this blood from returning to the heart). The same thing usually seems to happen also when we weep; for, as I shall explain shortly, tears are caused for the most part by a combination of love and sadness. And it is seen in anger, when a sudden desire for vengeance is often mingled with love, hatred and sadness.

415

118. *Trembling*

There are two distinct causes of trembling. One is that sometimes too few of the spirits in the brain enter into the nerves to be able to close the little passages of the muscles in just the way that, according to the account given in article 11, they must be closed in order to cause the movements of the limbs; and the other is that sometimes too many of the spirits enter into the nerves to be able to do this. The first cause is seen in sadness and fear, and also when we tremble with cold. For these passions, like the coldness of the air, may cause the blood to thicken so much that it does not supply enough spirits to the brain to permit any to be sent to the nerves. The other cause is often seen in those who keenly desire something, or are strongly moved by anger, and also in those who are drunk. For these two passions, as well as wine, sometimes make so many spirits go to the brain that they cannot be directed from there in an orderly way into the muscles.

416

119. Listlessness

Listlessness is an inclination felt in all the limbs to relax and remain motionless. As in the case of trembling, but in a different way, it results from too few spirits entering into the nerves. For the cause of trembling is that there are not enough spirits in the brain to carry out the directions of the gland when it drives them to some muscle; whereas listlessness results from the gland's not directing the spirits to some muscles rather than others.

417 120. *How it is caused by love and by desire*

The passion that most commonly brings about this effect is love, combined with desire, for a thing whose acquisition is not imagined to be possible at the present time. For love makes the soul so engrossed in thinking about the loved object that it uses all the spirits in the brain in representing the image of this object, and it stops all the movements of the gland which do not serve this purpose. And regarding desire, it must be observed that the property of making the body more mobile, which I ascribed to it earlier,¹ applies to it only when we imagine the desired object to be something which we are able at that time to take steps towards acquiring. For if we imagine, on the contrary, that it is impossible to do anything that might serve this end, all the agitation due to the desire remains in the brain without passing into the nerves; and, serving only to strengthen the idea of the desired object, this agitation leaves the rest of the body in a listless state.

121. *It may also be caused by other passions*

418 It is true that hatred, sadness and even joy may also cause some listlessness when it is very violent, because it makes the soul wholly engrossed in thinking about its object; this happens chiefly when these passions are combined with the desire for something which we cannot do anything to acquire at the present time. But listlessness is encountered much more in love than in all the other passions. For we pause much more to think about objects to which we join ourselves willingly than to think about objects from which we separate ourselves, or about any other objects; and listlessness does not depend on surprise but requires some time for its formation.

122. *Fainting*

Fainting is not far removed from dying, for we die when the fire in our heart is completely extinguished, and we merely fall into a faint when it is

¹ Art. 101, p. 363, above.

smothered in such a way that there remain some traces of heat which may afterwards rekindle it. There are many bodily indispositions which may cause us to fall into a faint; but among the passions it is only extreme joy that we observe to have the power to do this. Here is the way in which I believe it causes this effect. It opens the orifices of the heart unusually wide, so that the blood from the veins enters the heart so suddenly and so copiously that it cannot be rarefied by the heat in the heart quickly enough to raise all the little membranes which close the entrances to these veins. In this way the blood smothers the fire which it usually maintains when it enters the heart in moderate amounts.

123. *Why sadness does not cause us to faint*

419

It seems that a great sadness which comes upon us unexpectedly ought to grip the orifices of the heart so tightly as to extinguish the fire; yet we do not observe this to happen, or if it happens it does so very rarely. The reason for this, I believe, is that there can hardly ever be insufficient blood in the heart to maintain the heat there when its orifices are almost closed.

124. *Laughter*

Laughter results when the blood coming from the right-hand cavity of the heart through the arterial vein causes the lungs to swell up suddenly and repeatedly, forcing the air they contain to rush out through the windpipe, where it forms an inarticulate, explosive sound. As the air is expelled, the lungs are swollen so much that they push against all the muscles of the diaphragm, chest and throat, thus causing movement in the facial muscles with which these organs are connected. And it is just this facial expression, together with the inarticulate and explosive sound, that we call 'laughter'.

125. *Why laughter does not accompany the greatest joys*

420

Now although laughter seems to be one of the chief signs of joy, yet joy cannot cause laughter except when it is moderate and mixed with an element of wonder or hatred. For we find by experience that when we are unusually joyful, the subject of this joy never makes us burst into laughter; and indeed, we are never so ready to laugh as when we are sad. The reason for this is that in great joy the lungs are always so full that they cannot be swollen any more by further surges of blood.

126. *The principal causes of laughter*

I can see only two things that might cause the lungs to swell up suddenly in this way. The first is the surprise of wonder, which may be combined with joy so as to open the orifices of the heart so rapidly that a great

quantity of blood suddenly enters its right-hand side from the vena cava, becomes rarefied there, and passes through the arterial vein to swell up the lungs. The other is the admixture of some liquid which increases the rarefaction of the blood. I cannot discover any such liquid other than the
 421 most fluid part of that which comes from the spleen. Driven to the heart by some slight emotion of hatred (helped by the surprise of wonder), this part of the blood mingles there with the blood coming from other regions of the body (which joy drives into the heart in abundance) and may cause this blood to expand much more than usual. We see the same thing in a number of other liquids, which suddenly swell up when we throw a little vinegar into a vessel containing them over a fire. For the most fluid part of the blood coming from the spleen has a nature similar to that of vinegar. Experience also reveals that in every situation which may cause such laughter to burst forth from the lungs, there is always some slight occasion for hatred, or at least for wonder. And those with an unhealthy spleen are apt not only to be sadder than others, but also at times to be more cheerful and more disposed to laughter, inasmuch as the spleen sends two kinds of blood to the heart, one very thick and coarse, which causes sadness, and the other fluid and thin, which causes joy. And we often feel ourselves naturally inclined to be sad after we have laughed a lot, because the more fluid part of the blood in the spleen has been exhausted and the other, coarser part follows it to the heart.

127. *What causes laughter in the case of indignation*

As for the laughter which sometimes accompanies indignation, it is
 422 usually artificial and feigned. But when it is natural, it seems to result from the joy we feel in seeing that we cannot be harmed by the evil at which we are indignant, together with our surprise at the novelty of the evil or at our unexpected encounter with it. So it is that joy, hatred and wonder contribute to indignation. Yet I am willing to believe that it may also be produced without any joy, by the movement of aversion alone, which sends blood from the spleen to the heart, where the blood is rarefied and then driven to the lungs, which it readily causes to swell when it finds them almost empty. In general, whatever may suddenly make the lungs swell up in this manner causes the external action of laughter, except when sadness changes it into the groans and cries which accompany tears. Regarding this matter, Vives writes that when he had gone without eating for a long time, the first pieces of food that he put in his mouth caused him to laugh.¹ This could result from the fact that his lungs, emptied of blood by lack of nourishment, were rapidly swollen by

1 J. L. Vives, *De Anima et Vita* (1538), ch. 3. Juan Luis Vives (1493–1540) was a humanist scholar celebrated as an educational theorist and a critic of scholastic logic.

the first juice which passed from his stomach to his heart, and which the mere imagination of eating could direct there even before the arrival of the juice of the food he was eating.

128. *The origin of tears*

As laughter is never caused by the greatest joys, so tears do not result from an extreme sadness, but only from a sadness that is moderate and accompanied or followed by some feeling of love or joy. To understand their origin properly, we must observe that although lots of vapours continually issue from all parts of our body, there are none from which so many issue as from the eyes. This is caused by the size of the optic nerves and the multitude of little arteries by which the vapours get there. Just as sweat is composed merely of vapours which are converted into water on the surface of the parts from which they issue, so tears are formed from the vapours that issue from our eyes. 423

129. *How the vapours are changed into water*

In the *Meteorology*, to explain how the vapours of the air are transformed into rain, I wrote that this results from their being less agitated or more abundant than usual.¹ Likewise I believe that when the vapours issuing from the body are much less agitated than usual, even if they are not so abundant, they are still transformed into water; this causes the cold sweats which sometimes result from weakness when we are ill. And I believe that the bodily vapours are also transformed into water when they are much more abundant, provided they are not at the same time more agitated. This causes the sweat which occurs when we take exercise. But the eyes do not weep then, because during bodily exercise the greatest part of the spirits go to the muscles used in moving the body, and less of them go through the optic nerve to the eyes. It is one and the same matter that forms blood (when in the veins or the arteries), the spirits (when in the brain, nerves, or muscles), vapours (when it issues forth in the form of air), and finally sweat or tears (when it thickens into water on the surfaces of the body or the eyes). 424

130. *How something that causes pain in the eye makes it weep*

I can observe only two causes that make the vapours issuing from the eyes change into tears. The first is a change in the shape of the pores through which they pass. By whatever accident this may happen, it retards the movement of these vapours and changes their order, and so may cause them to be transformed into water. Thus a speck in our eye is

1 *Meteorology*, Disc. 2 (AT vi 239ff).

enough to draw forth tears. For in producing pain there it changes the arrangement of the eye's pores so that some of them become narrower, and the tiny parts of the vapours pass through them less quickly. Hence,
 425 whereas previously they issued forth equidistant from each other, and so remained separated, they now come together because the order of the pores is disturbed. In this way the parts of the vapours are joined together, and so transformed into tears.

131. *How we weep from sadness*

The other cause of tears is sadness followed by love or joy, or in general by some cause which makes the heart drive a lot of blood through the arteries. Sadness is required for this, because in chilling all the blood again it constricts the pores of the eyes. But to the extent that it constricts them, it also decreases the quantity of the vapours which can pass through them, and for this reason sadness is not sufficient to produce tears unless the quantity of these vapours is increased at the same time by some other cause. And there is nothing which increases it more than the blood which is sent to the heart in the passion of love. We see, too, that those who are sad do not shed tears continually, but only intermittently, when they reflect anew upon the objects of their affection.

132. *The groans which accompany tears*

The lungs are also sometimes suddenly swollen by the abundance of the
 426 blood which enters them and expels the air they contained. As this air goes out through the windpipe it produces the groans and cries which customarily accompany tears. These cries are usually shriller than those accompanying laughter, although they are produced in almost the same way. The reason for this is that the nerves that enlarge or constrict the vocal organs, making the voice louder or shriller, are joined with those that open the orifices of the heart when we are joyful and constrict them when we are sad, and so they make the vocal organs become wider or narrower at the same time.

133. *Why children and old people weep readily*

Children and old people are more inclined to weep than the middle-aged, but for different reasons. Old people often weep from affection and joy. For when these two passions are combined together they send a lot of blood to the heart, and many vapours from there to the eyes. And the agitation of these vapours is reduced to such an extent by the coldness of their nature that the vapours are easily transformed into tears even without any preceding sadness. And if some old people also weep very readily from vexation, it is not so much the temperament of their body as

of their mind which so disposes them. This happens only to those who are so weak that they let themselves be utterly overcome by trivial matters involving pain, fear, or pity. The same thing happens with children, who hardly ever weep from joy, but much more often from sadness, even when it is not accompanied by love. For children always have enough blood to produce a lot of vapours; and these turn into tears when their movement is retarded by the sadness. 427

134. *Why some children grow pale instead of weeping*

Yet there are some children who, instead of weeping, grow pale when they are angry. This may indicate unusual discernment and courage on their part, namely when it results from their considering the extent of some evil and preparing themselves to resist it strongly, in the same fashion as those who are older. But more commonly it indicates a bad nature, namely when it results from their being inclined to hatred or fear. For these are passions which decrease the matter of which tears are formed. We observe, on the other hand, that children who weep very readily are inclined to love and to pity.

135. *Sighs*

The cause of sighs is very different from that of tears, even though they are similar in presupposing sadness. For whereas we are moved to weep when our lungs are full of blood, we are moved to sigh when they are almost empty and some imagined hope or joy opens the orifice of the venous artery which sadness had constricted. Then the little blood remaining in the lungs flows down suddenly into the left-hand side of the heart through this artery, where it is driven by the desire to attain this joy. At the same time this desire agitates all the muscles of the diaphragm and chest, so that air comes rapidly through the mouth into the lungs to fill the place vacated by the blood. And that is what we call 'sighing'. 428

136. *How the passions which are peculiar to certain persons produce their effects*

For the rest, so as to put in a few words all the points that might be added regarding the different effects or different causes of the passions, I shall content myself with repeating the principle which underlies everything I have written about them – namely, that our soul and body are so linked that once we have joined some bodily action with a certain thought, the one does not occur thereafter without the other occurring too; but we do not always join the same actions to the same thoughts. This principle alone can account for any particular phenomenon involving the passions, whether in oneself or in others, which has not been explained here. For 429

example, the strange aversions of certain people that make them unable to bear the smell of roses, the presence of a cat, or the like, can readily be recognized as resulting simply from their having been greatly upset by some such object in the early years of their life. Or it may even result from their having been affected by the feelings their mother had when she was upset by such an object while pregnant; for there certainly is a connection between all the movements of a mother and those of a child in her womb, so that anything adverse to the one is harmful to the other. And the smell of roses may have caused severe headache in a child when he was still in the cradle, or a cat may have terrified him without anyone noticing and without any memory of it remaining afterwards; and yet the idea of the aversion he then felt for the roses or for the cat will remain imprinted on his brain till the end of his life.

137. *The function of the five passions explained here, in so far as they relate to the body*

430 Having given definitions of love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness, and dealt with all the bodily movements which cause or accompany them, we have only to consider their function. Regarding this, it must be observed that they are all ordained by nature to relate to the body, and to belong to the soul only in so far as it is joined with the body. Hence, their natural function is to move the soul to consent and contribute to actions which may serve to preserve the body or render it in some way more perfect. From this point of view, sadness and joy are the two passions that have primary application. For it is only through a feeling of pain that the soul is immediately advised about things that harm the body: this feeling produces in the soul first the passion of sadness, then hatred of what causes the pain, and finally the desire to get rid of it. Similarly the soul is immediately advised about things useful to the body only through some sort of titillation, which first produces joy within it, then gives rise to love of what we believe to be its cause, and finally brings about the desire to acquire something that can enable us to continue in this joy, or else to have a similar joy again later on. This shows that these five passions are all very useful with respect to the body. It shows too that sadness is in some way primary and more necessary than joy, and hatred more necessary than love; for it is more important to reject things which are harmful and potentially destructive than to acquire those which add some perfection which we can subsist without.

431 138. *Their faults and the means of correcting them*

This function of the passions is the most natural that they can have. For all the animals devoid of reason conduct their lives simply through bodily

movements similar to those which, in our case, usually follow upon the passions which move our soul to consent to such movements. Nevertheless it is not always good for the passions to function in this way, in so far as there are many things harmful to the body which cause no sadness initially (or which even produce joy), and in so far as other things are useful to the body, although at first they are disagreeable. Furthermore, the passions almost always cause the goods they represent, as well as the evils, to appear much greater and more important than they are, thus moving us to pursue the former and flee from the latter with more ardour and zeal than is appropriate. Likewise, we see that animals are often deceived by lures, and in seeking to avoid small evils they throw themselves into greater evils. That is why we must use experience and reason in order to distinguish good from evil and know their true value, so as not to take the one for the other or rush into anything immoderately.

139. *The function of these passions in so far as they belong to the soul; firstly, of love* 432

This would be sufficient if we had in us only a body, or if the body were our better part. But as it is only the lesser part, we should consider the passions chiefly in so far as they belong to the soul. In this regard, love and hatred result from knowledge and precede joy and sadness, except when the latter stands in place of the knowledge of which they are species.¹ And when this knowledge is true – that is, when the things it brings us to love are truly good and those it brings us to hate are truly bad – love is incomparably better than hatred: it can never be too great, and it never fails to produce joy. I say that this love is extremely good because by joining real goods to us it makes us to that extent more perfect. I say also that it cannot be too great, for all that the most excessive love can do is to join us so perfectly to these goods that the love we have especially for ourselves must apply to them as well as to us; and this, I believe, can never be bad. And it is necessarily followed by joy, because it represents to us what we love as a good belonging to us.

140. *Hatred*

Hatred, on the other hand, cannot be so mild as to be harmless, and it is never devoid of sadness. I say it cannot be too mild because, however much the hatred of an evil moves us to an action, we could always be moved to it even more effectively by love of the contrary good – at least when the good and evil are adequately known. For I acknowledge that

1 Cf. art. 79, p. 356 above. Love and hatred result from judgements concerning good and evil, and when these judgements constitute knowledge of good or evil, they are accompanied by joy or sadness.

hatred of the evil which is manifested solely by pain is necessary where the body is concerned; but I am speaking here only about the hatred which results from a clearer knowledge, which I refer to the soul alone. I say also that this hatred is never without sadness because evil, being merely a privation, cannot be conceived without some real subject in which it exists; and there is nothing real which does not have some goodness in it. Hence the hatred which takes us away from some evil likewise takes us away from the good to which it is joined, and the privation of this good, being represented to our soul as a fault belonging to it, arouses sadness in it. For example, the hatred which takes us away from someone's evil habits likewise takes us away from his company; and we might otherwise find in the latter some good which we should be sorry to be deprived of. So too, in all other cases of hatred we can see some reason for sadness.

434 141. *Desire, joy and sadness*

As for desire, it is obvious that when it proceeds from true knowledge it cannot be bad, provided it is not excessive and that it is governed by this knowledge. It is obvious too that joy cannot fail to be good, nor sadness bad, with respect to the soul. For the discomfort which the soul receives from evil consists wholly in the latter, and the enjoyment of the good belonging to the soul consists wholly in the former. Thus, if we had no body, I venture to say we could not go too far in abandoning ourselves to love and joy, or in avoiding hatred and sadness. But the bodily movements accompanying these passions may all be injurious to health when they are very violent; on the other hand, they may be beneficial to it when they are only moderate.

142. *Joy and love, compared with sadness and hatred*

435 Moreover, since hatred and sadness should be rejected by the soul, even when they proceed from true knowledge, there is all the more reason to reject them when they result from some false opinion. But it may be questioned whether love and joy are good when they rest in this way on a bad foundation. It seems to me that if we consider them just as they are in themselves with respect to the soul, we may say that although joy is less secure, and love less beneficial, than when they have a better foundation, they are still preferable to any sadness or hatred resting on an equally bad foundation. Thus, in the affairs of everyday life, where we cannot avoid the risk of being mistaken, it is always much better for us to incline towards the passions which tend to the good than for us to incline towards those which relate to evil (even if we do so only in order to avoid it); and even a false joy is often more valuable than a sadness whose cause is true. But I dare not say the same about love in relation to hatred. For

when hatred is justified it simply takes us away from a subject containing an evil from which it is good to be separated; whereas a love which is unjustified joins us to things which may be harmful, or at least which deserve less consideration than we give them, and this demeans and debases us.

143. *The same passions in so far as they relate to desire*

We must take care to observe that what I have just said about these four passions holds only when they are considered exactly in themselves, and they do not lead us to perform any action. For in so far as they govern our behaviour by producing desire in us, it is certain that all those having a false cause may be harmful, while by contrast all having a just cause may be useful. And even when they rest on equally bad foundations, joy is usually more harmful than sadness, because the latter engenders restraint and anxiety, and so disposes us in a certain way to prudence, whereas the former make those who abandon themselves to it rash and imprudent.

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144. *Desires whose attainment depends only on us*

But because these passions cannot lead us to perform any action except by means of the desire they produce, it is this desire which we should take particular care to control; and here lies the chief utility of morality. As I have just said, desire is always good when it conforms to true knowledge; likewise it cannot fail to be bad when based on some error. And it seems to me that the error we commit most commonly in respect of desires is failure to distinguish adequately the things which depend wholly on us from those which do not depend on us at all. Regarding those which depend only on us – that is, on our free will – our knowledge of their goodness ensures that we cannot desire them with too much ardour, since the pursuit of virtue consists in doing the good things that depend on us, and it is certain that we cannot have too ardent a desire for virtue. Moreover, what we desire in this way cannot fail to have a happy outcome for us, since it depends on us alone, and so we always receive from it all the satisfaction we expected from it. But the mistake we ordinarily make in this regard is never that we desire too much; it is rather that we desire too little. The supreme remedy against this mistake is to free our mind as much as possible from all kinds of other less useful desires, and then to try to know very clearly, and to consider with attention, the goodness of that which is to be desired.

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145. *Those desires which depend solely on other causes; and what Fortune is*

Regarding the things which do not depend on us in any way, we must never desire them with passion, however good they may be. This holds

not only because they may not happen, thus making us the more irritated the more strongly we wished for them, but chiefly because in occupying our thoughts they prevent our forming a liking for other things whose acquisition depends on us. There are two general remedies for such vain desires. The first is generosity, about which I shall speak later. The second is frequent reflection upon divine Providence: we should reflect upon the fact that nothing can possibly happen other than as Providence has determined from all eternity. Providence is, so to speak, a fate or immutable necessity, which we must set against Fortune in order to expose the latter as a chimera which arises solely from an error of our intellect. For we can desire only what we consider in some way to be possible; and things which do not depend on us can be considered possible only in so far as they are thought to depend on Fortune – that is to say, in so far as we judge that they may happen and that similar things have happened at other times. But this opinion is based solely on our not knowing all the causes which contribute to each effect. For when a thing we considered to depend on Fortune does not happen, this indicates that one of the causes necessary for its production was absent, and consequently that it was absolutely impossible and that no similar thing has ever happened, i.e. nothing for the production of which a similar cause was also absent. Had we not been ignorant of this beforehand, we should never have considered it possible and consequently we should never have desired it.

439 146. *Those desires which depend on us and on others*

We must, then, utterly reject the common opinion that there is a Fortune outside us which causes things to happen or not to happen, just as it pleases. And we must recognize that everything is guided by divine Providence, whose eternal decree is infallible and immutable to such an extent that, except for matters it has determined to be dependent on our free will, we must consider everything that affects us to occur of necessity and as it were by fate, so that it would be wrong for us to desire things to happen in any other way. But most of our desires extend to matters which do not depend wholly on us or wholly on others, and we must therefore take care to pick out just what depends only on us, so as to limit our desire to that alone. As for the rest, although we must consider their outcome to be wholly fated and immutable, so as to prevent our desire from occupying itself with them, yet we must not fail to consider the reasons which make them more or less predictable, so as to use these reasons in governing our actions. Thus, for example, suppose we have business in some place to which we might travel by two different routes, one usually much safer than the other. And suppose Providence decrees

that if we go by the route we regard as safer we shall not avoid being robbed, whereas we may travel by the other route without any danger. Nevertheless, we should not be indifferent as to which one we choose, or rely upon the immutable fatality of this decree. Reason insists that we choose the route which is usually the safer, and our desire in this case must be fulfilled when we have followed this route, whatever evil may befall us; for, since any such evil was inevitable from our point of view, we had no reason to wish to be exempt from it: we had reason only to do the best that our intellect was able to recognize, as I am supposing that we did. And it is certain that when we apply ourselves to distinguish Fatality from Fortune in this way, we easily acquire the habit of governing our desires so that their fulfillment depends only on us, making it possible for them always to give us complete satisfaction. 440

147. *The internal emotions of the soul*

Here I shall merely add one further consideration which, it seems to me, serves very well to prevent us from suffering any discomfort from the passions. It is that our well-being depends principally on internal emotions which are produced in the soul only by the soul itself. In this respect they differ from its passions, which always depend on some movement of the spirits. Although these emotions of the soul are often joined with the passions which are similar to them, they frequently occur with others, and they may even originate in those to which they are opposed. For example, when a husband mourns his dead wife, it sometimes happens that he would be sorry to see her brought to life again. It may be that his heart is torn by the sadness aroused in him by the funeral display and by the absence of a person to whose company he was accustomed. And it may be that some remnants of love or of pity occur in his imagination and draw genuine tears from his eyes. Nevertheless he feels at the same time a secret joy in his innermost soul, and the emotion of this joy has such power that the concomitant sadness and tears can do nothing to diminish its force. Again, when we read of strange adventures in a book, or see them acted out on the stage, this sometimes arouses sadness in us, sometimes joy, or love, or hatred, and generally any of the passions, depending on the diversity of the objects which are presented to our imagination. But we also have pleasure in feeling them aroused in us, and this pleasure is an intellectual joy which may as readily originate in sadness as in any of the other passions. 441

148. *The exercise of virtue is a supreme remedy against the passions*

Now these internal emotions affect us more intimately, and consequently have much more power over us than the passions which occur with them. 442

but are distinct from them. To this extent it is certain that, provided our soul always has the means of happiness within itself, all the troubles coming from elsewhere are powerless to harm it. Such troubles will serve rather to increase its joy; for on seeing that it cannot be harmed by them, it becomes aware of its perfection. And in order that our soul should have the means of happiness, it needs only to pursue virtue diligently. For if anyone lives in such a way that his conscience cannot reproach him for ever failing to do something he judges to be the best (which is what I here call 'pursuing virtue'), he will receive from this a satisfaction which has such power to make him happy that the most violent assaults of the passions will never have sufficient power to disturb the tranquillity of his soul.

PART THREE

Specific Passions

443

149. *Esteem and contempt*

After having explained the six primitive passions – which are, as it were, the genera of which all the others are species – I shall make brief observations about the special features of each of the others, keeping the same order as in the foregoing enumeration. The first two are esteem and contempt. Usually the terms ‘esteem’ and ‘contempt’ signify only our dispassionate opinions concerning a thing’s value. But such opinions often give rise to passions having no particular name, and it seems to me that the terms may be applied to these passions. Esteem, regarded as a passion, is the soul’s inclination to represent to itself the value of the object of its esteem, this inclination being caused by a special movement of the spirits which are so directed in the brain that they strengthen the impressions having this effect. The passion of contempt, on the other hand, is the soul’s inclination to consider the baseness or insignificance of the object of its contempt, and is caused by a movement of the spirits which strengthens the idea of this insignificance. 444

150. *These two passions are merely species of wonder*

So these two passions are merely species of wonder. For when we do not wonder at the greatness or the insignificance of an object, making no more of it and no less of it than reason deems we ought, then our esteem or contempt for it is dispassionate. And although esteem is often aroused in us by love, and contempt by hatred, this does not hold generally: it results simply from our being more or less inclined to consider the greatness or the insignificance of an object because we have more or less affection for it.

151. *We may have esteem or contempt for ourselves*

In general, these two passions may relate to all sorts of objects. But they are chiefly noteworthy when we refer them to ourselves, i.e. when it is our own merit for which we have esteem or contempt. The movement of 445

the spirits which causes them in this case is so manifest that it changes even the appearance, gestures, gait and, generally, all the actions of those who conceive an unusually better or worse opinion of themselves.

152. *For what reasons we may have esteem for ourselves*

Since one of the principal parts of wisdom is to know in what manner and for what reason anyone ought to have esteem or contempt for himself, I shall try to give my views on this question. I see only one thing in us which could give us good reason for esteeming ourselves, namely, the exercise of our free will and the control we have over our volitions. For we can reasonably be praised or blamed only for actions that depend upon this free will. It renders us in a certain way like God by making us masters of ourselves, provided we do not lose the rights it gives us through timidity.

153. *What generosity consists in*

446 Thus I believe that true generosity, which causes a person's self-esteem to be as great as it may legitimately be, has only two components. The first consists in his knowing that nothing truly belongs to him but this freedom to dispose his volitions, and that he ought to be praised or blamed for no other reason than his using this freedom well or badly. The second consists in his feeling within himself a firm and constant resolution to use it well – that is, never to lack the will to undertake and carry out whatever he judges to be best. To do that is to pursue virtue in a perfect manner.

154. *Generosity prevents us from having contempt for others*

Those who possess this knowledge and this feeling about themselves readily come to believe that any other person can have the same knowledge and feeling about himself, because this involves nothing which depends on someone else. That is why such people never have contempt for anyone. Although they often see that others do wrong in ways that show up their weakness, they are nevertheless more inclined to excuse than to blame them and to regard such wrong-doing as due rather to lack of knowledge than to lack of a virtuous will. Just as they do not consider themselves much inferior to those who have greater wealth or honour, or even to those who have more intelligence, knowledge or beauty, or generally to those who surpass them in some other perfections, 447
equally they do not have much more esteem for themselves than for those whom they surpass. For all these things seem to them to be very unimportant, by contrast with the virtuous will for which alone they esteem themselves, and which they suppose also to be present, or at least capable of being present, in every other person.

155. *What humility as a virtue consists in*

Thus the most generous people are usually also the most humble. We have humility as a virtue when, as a result of reflecting on the infirmity of our nature and on the wrongs we may previously have done, or are capable of doing (wrongs which are no less serious than those which others may do), we do not prefer ourselves to anyone else and we think that since others have free will just as much as we do, they may use it just as well as we use ours.

156. *The properties of generosity; and how generosity serves as a remedy against all the disorders of the passions*

Those who are generous in this way are naturally led to do great deeds, and at the same time not to undertake anything of which they do not feel themselves capable. And because they esteem nothing more highly than doing good to others and disregarding their own self-interest, they are always perfectly courteous, gracious and obliging to everyone. Moreover they have complete command over their passions. In particular, they have mastery over their desires, and over jealousy and envy, because everything they think sufficiently valuable to be worth pursuing is such that its acquisition depends solely on themselves; over hatred of other people, because they have esteem for everyone; over fear, because of the self-assurance which confidence in their own virtue gives them; and finally over anger, because they have very little esteem for everything that depends on others, and so they never give their enemies any advantage by acknowledging that they are injured by them.

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157. *Vanity*

All who conceive a good opinion of themselves for any other reason, whatever it might be, do not possess true generosity, but only a vanity which is always a vice, and is all the more so the less justification such people have for esteeming themselves highly. They have the least justification when they are vain for no reason at all – that is, not because they think they have any merit for which they ought to be valued, but simply because they do not regard merit as important: imagining pride to be nothing but self-glorification, they believe that those who attribute the most merit to themselves actually have the most merit. This vice is so unreasonable and absurd that I would find it difficult to believe there are men who allow themselves to fall into it, if no one was ever praised unjustly. But flattery is so common everywhere that there is no man whose faults are so great that he never finds himself esteemed for things which are not praiseworthy or even for things which are blameworthy.

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This causes the most ignorant and most stupid people to fall into this sort of vanity.

158. *The effects of vanity are contrary to those of generosity*

The volition we feel within ourselves always to make good use of our free will results, as I have said, in generosity. But any other cause of self-esteem, whatever it might be, produces a highly blameworthy vanity, which is so different from true generosity that it has quite the opposite effects. For all other goods, like intelligence, beauty, riches, honours, etc., are commonly esteemed so highly because so few people have them, and for the most part their nature is such that they cannot be shared by many people. The result is that vain people attempt to humble everyone else: being slaves to their desires, they have souls which are constantly agitated by hatred, envy, jealousy, or anger.

450 159. *Humility as a vice*

Abjectness, or humility as a vice, consists chiefly in a feeling of weakness or irresolution, together with an incapacity to refrain from actions which we know we shall regret later on, as if we lacked the full use of our free will. It involves also the belief that we cannot subsist by ourselves or get along without many things whose acquisition depends on others. Thus it is directly opposed to generosity, and it often happens that the most mean-spirited people are the most arrogant and haughty, just as the most generous are the most modest and humble. But whereas those who have a strong and generous spirit do not change their mood to suit the prosperity or adversity which comes their way, those with a weak and abject spirit are guided by chance alone, and are no more elated by prosperity than humbled by adversity. Indeed, we often see them shamefully abase themselves before those from whom they expect some advantage or fear some evil, while at the same time they insolently lord it over those from whom they do not expect or fear anything.

451 160. *The movement of the spirits in these passions*

It is easy to see that vanity and abjectness are not only vices but also passions. For their emotion is quite apparent in the demeanour of those who are suddenly elated or depressed by some new happening. But it may be questioned whether generosity and humility, which are virtues, can also be passions. For their movements are less apparent, and it seems that virtue is not so closely associated with passion as vice is. Yet I see no reason why the same movement of the spirits which serves to strengthen a thought which has bad foundations might not also strengthen one that is well-founded. And because vanity and generosity consist simply in the good opinion we have of ourselves – the only difference being that this

opinion is unjustified in the one case and justified in the other – I think we can relate them to one and the same passion. This passion is produced by a movement made up of those of wonder, of joy, and of love (self-love as much as the love we have for the cause of our self-esteem). On the other hand, the movement which produces humility, whether of the virtuous or the vicious kind, is made up of those of wonder, of sadness, and of self-love mingled with hatred for the faults that give rise to self-contempt. 452

And the difference I observe between these movements arises wholly from two properties of the movement of wonder: first, that surprise makes the movement vigorous from the start; and second, that the movement continues uniformly in this way, i.e. the spirits continue to move in the brain with the same degree of vigour. Of these properties the first is found much more in vanity and abjectness than in generosity and humility of the virtuous kind; the second, on the other hand, is more prominent in the latter pair than in the former. The reason for this is that vice usually proceeds from ignorance, and those with the least knowledge of themselves are the most liable to become prouder or humbler than they ought. For they are surprised by anything new that comes their way, and so they attribute it to themselves and wonder at themselves, and have either esteem or contempt for themselves depending on whether they judge the novelty to be to their advantage or not. But often one thing that makes them proud is followed by another that makes them humble; and for this reason their passion involves a variable movement of the spirits. On the other hand, there is no incompatibility between generosity and humility of the virtuous kind, nor is there anything else which might change them; this results in their movements being firm, constant and always very similar to each other. But these movements are not due so much to surprise, because those who esteem themselves in this way are well acquainted with the causes of their self-esteem. It may be said, however, that these causes are so marvellous (namely, the power to make use of our free will, which causes us to value ourselves, and the infirmities 453 of the subject who has this power, which cause us not to esteem ourselves too highly) that each time we consider them afresh they are a source of new wonder.

161. *How generosity may be acquired*

It should be noted that what we commonly call 'virtues' are habits in the soul which dispose it to have certain thoughts: though different from the thoughts, these habits can produce them and in turn can be produced by them. It should also be noted that the thoughts may be produced by the soul alone; but it often happens that some movement of the spirits strengthens them, and in this case they are both actions of virtue and at

the same time passions of the soul. There is, it seems, no virtue so dependent on good birth as the virtue which causes us to esteem ourselves in accordance with our true value, and it is easy to believe that the souls which God puts into our bodies are not all equally noble and strong (which is why, following the vernacular, I have called this virtue 'generosity' rather than 'magnanimity', a term used in the Schools, where this virtue is not well known). It is certain, however, that a good upbringing is a great help in correcting defects of birth. Moreover, if we occupy ourselves frequently in considering the nature of free will and the many advantages which proceed from a firm resolution to make good use of it – while also considering, on the other hand, the many vain and useless cares which trouble ambitious people – we may arouse the passion of generosity in ourselves and then acquire the virtue. Since this virtue is, as it were, the key to all the other virtues and a general remedy for every disorder of the passions, it seems to me that this consideration deserves serious attention.

162. *Veneration*

Veneration or respect is an inclination of the soul not only to have esteem for the object that it reveres but also to submit to it with some fear in order to try to gain its favour. Accordingly we have veneration only for free causes which we judge capable of doing us good or evil, without our knowing which they will do. For we have love and devotion rather than simple veneration for those causes from which we expect only good, and we have hatred for those from which we expect only evil. And if we do not judge the cause of this good or evil to be free, we do not submit to it in order to try to gain its favour. Thus, when the pagans had veneration for woods, springs, or mountains, it was not strictly speaking these dead things that they revered, but the divinities which they believed to preside over them. The movement of the spirits which produces this passion is composed of that which produces wonder and that which produces fear (about which I shall speak later).

163. *Scorn*

At the same time, what I call 'scorn' is our soul's inclination to despise a free cause in judging it so far beneath us that, although by nature capable of doing good or evil, it is incapable of doing either to us. And the movement of the spirits which produces scorn is composed of those which produce wonder and confidence or boldness.

164. *The function of these two passions*

It is generosity and weakness of spirit or abjectness which determine whether these two passions have a good or an evil use. For the more

noble and generous our soul is, the more we are inclined to render to each person that which belongs to him; thus, not only do we have a very deep humility before God, but also we are not reluctant to render to each person all the honour and respect due to him according to his position and authority in the world, and we have contempt solely for vices. On the other hand, abject and weak spirits are liable to sin by excess, sometimes in revering and fearing things which deserve nothing but contempt, and sometimes in haughtily scorning things which are most deserving of reverence. They often pass very rapidly from extreme impiety to superstition, and then from superstition back to impiety, so that there is no vice or disorder of the mind of which they are not capable. 456

165. *Hope and anxiety*

Hope is a disposition of the soul to be convinced that what it desires will come about. It is caused by a particular movement of the spirits, consisting of the movement of joy mixed with that of desire. And anxiety is another disposition of the soul, which convinces it that its desires will not be fulfilled. It should be noted that these two passions, although opposed, may nevertheless occur together, namely when we think of reasons for regarding the fulfilment of the desire as easy, and at the same time we think of other reasons which make it seem difficult.

166. *Confidence and despair*

Neither of these passions ever accompanies desire without leaving some room for the other. For when hope is so strong that it entirely excludes anxiety, its nature changes and it is called 'confidence' or 'assurance'. And when we are assured that what we desire will come about, then although we still want it to come about we are no longer agitated by the passion of desire, which made us await the outcome with concern. All the same, when anxiety is so extreme that it leaves no room for hope, it changes into despair; and this despair, representing the thing desired as impossible, entirely extinguishes desire, which applies only to things that are possible. 459

167. *Jealousy*

Jealousy is a kind of anxiety which is related to our desire to preserve for ourselves the possession of some good. It does not result so much from the strength of the reasons which make us believe we may lose the good, as from the high esteem in which we hold it. This causes us to examine the slightest grounds for doubt, and to regard them as very considerable reasons.

458 168. *In what respect this passion may be proper*

Because we ought to take more care to preserve goods which are very great than those which are less great, this passion may be right and proper on certain occasions. Thus, for example, a captain defending a very important position has the right to be jealous of it, i.e. to examine with great care all the ways by which it might be surprised; and a virtuous woman is not blamed for being jealous of her honour, i.e. for taking care not only to behave well but also to avoid even the slightest cause for scandal.

169. *In what respect jealousy is blameworthy*

But we laugh at a miser when he is jealous of his hoard – that is, when he gazes fondly at it and wants it always near him for fear of its being stolen – for money is not worth the trouble of such safeguarding. And we have contempt for a man who is jealous of his wife, because this indicates that he does not love her in the right way and that he has a bad opinion of himself or of her. I say that he does not love her in the right way, for if he truly loved her he would not have any inclination to distrust her. But
459 what he loves is not strictly her: it is only the good he imagines to consist in his having sole possession of her. And he would have no anxiety about the loss of this good if he did not think himself to be unworthy of it, or his wife to be unfaithful. Moreover this passion is related only to suspicion and distrust, for someone is not properly speaking jealous if he tries to avoid an evil about which he rightly feels anxious.

170. *Irresolution*

Irresolution is also a kind of anxiety. Keeping the soul balanced, as it were, between several actions open to it, irresolution causes it not to perform any of them, and thus gives it time to make a choice before committing itself. In this respect, indeed, it has a beneficial function. But when it lasts longer than it ought, making us spend in deliberation the time required for action, it is extremely bad. I call it a kind of anxiety even though we might remain uncertain and irresolute, while feeling no anxiety at all, when we can choose between several things which appear equally good. But this sort of irresolution proceeds merely from the object before us and not from any movement of the spirits. That is why it is not a passion, unless it happens that our anxiety of choosing wrongly
460 increases our uncertainty. But this anxiety is so common and so strong in some people that although they have no need to make a choice and they see only one thing to be taken or left, the anxiety often holds them back and makes them pause to search in vain for something else. In this case an excess of irresolution results from too great a desire to do well and from a

weakness of the intellect, which contains only a lot of confused notions, and none that are clear and distinct. That is why the remedy against such excess is to become accustomed to form certain and determinate judgements regarding everything that comes before us, and to believe that we always do our duty when we do what we judge to be best, even though our judgement may perhaps be a very bad one.

171. *Courage and boldness*

Courage, when a passion and not a habit or natural inclination, is a certain heat or agitation which disposes the soul to apply itself energetically to accomplish the tasks it wants to perform, whatever their nature may be. And boldness is a kind of courage which disposes the soul to carry out the most dangerous tasks.

172. *Emulation*

Emulation is also a kind of courage, but in another sense. For we may regard courage as a genus which divides into as many species as it has different objects, and into as many others as it has causes: boldness is a species of courage in the first sense, and emulation in the second. The latter is nothing but a heat which disposes the soul to undertake tasks in which it hopes to be able to succeed because it sees others succeed in them. Thus it is a species of courage of which the external cause is an example. I say 'external cause' because in addition there must always be an internal cause which consists in our body's being so disposed that desire and hope have more power to cause a quantity of blood to go to the heart than fear or despair have to stop it. 461

173. *How boldness depends on hope*

For it must be observed that the object of boldness is some difficulty which usually results in anxiety or even despair. Thus it is the most dangerous and desperate affairs in which we exercise the most boldness and courage. It is essential, however, that we should hope for success in attaining the goal, or even that we should be assured of it, in order to tackle vigorously the difficulties we encounter. But the goal is different from the object; for we could not be assured of something and also be desperate about it at the same time. Thus, when the Decii threw themselves against the enemy and ran to certain death, the object of their boldness was the difficulty of preserving their lives during this action, and about this difficulty they felt only despair, since they were certain to die. But their goal was to inspire their soldiers by their example and to cause them to win the victory, and they had some hope of achieving that; or else they had a further goal of gaining glory after their death, and of this they were assured. 462

174. *Timidity and fear*

Timidity is directly opposed to courage. It is a listlessness or coldness which prevents the soul from bringing itself to carry out the tasks which it would perform if it were free from this passion. And fear or terror, which is opposed to boldness, is not only a coldness, but also a disturbance and astonishment of the soul which deprives it of the power to resist the evils which it thinks lie close at hand.

175. *The function of timidity*

463 Although I cannot believe that nature has given to mankind any passion which is always vicious and has no good or praiseworthy function, I still find it very difficult to guess what purpose these two passions might serve. It seems to me that timidity has some use only when it frees us from making efforts which plausible reasons might move us to make if this passion had not been aroused by other, more certain reasons, which made us judge the efforts to be useless. Besides freeing the soul from such efforts, it is also useful for the body in that it slows the movement of the spirits and thereby prevents us from wasting our energy. But usually it is very harmful, because it diverts the will from useful actions. And because it results simply from our having insufficient hope or desire, we need only increase these two passions within us in order to correct it.

176. *The function of fear*

In the case of fear or terror, I do not see that it can ever be praiseworthy or useful. It, too, is not a specific passion, but merely an excess of timidity, wonder and anxiety – an excess which is always bad, just as boldness is an excess of courage which is always good (provided the end proposed is good). And because the principal cause of fear is surprise, there is no better way to avoid it than to exercise forethought and prepare oneself for any eventuality, anxiety about which may cause it.

464 177. *Remorse*

Remorse of conscience is a kind of sadness which results from our doubting that something we are doing, or have done, is good. It necessarily presupposes doubt. For if we were wholly certain that what we are doing is bad, we would refrain from doing it, since the will tends only towards objects that have some semblance of goodness. And if we were certain that what we have already done was bad, we would feel repentance for it, not simply remorse. The function of this passion is to make us inquire whether the object of our doubt is good or not, and to prevent our doing it another time, as long as we are not certain that it is

good. But because remorse presupposes evil, it would be better never to have occasion to feel it; and we may prevent it by the same means as those by which we can free ourselves from irresolution.

178. *Derision*

Ridicule or derision is a kind of joy mixed with hatred, which results from our perceiving some small evil in a person whom we consider to deserve it: we have hatred for the evil, but joy to see it in one who deserves it. When this comes upon us unexpectedly, the surprise of wonder causes us to burst into laughter, in accordance with what I said above about the nature of laughter.¹ But the evil must be insignificant. For if it is great, we cannot believe that the one who has it deserves it unless we have a very bad nature or we bear much hatred towards him. 465

179. *Why the most imperfect people are usually the most given to derision*

Those who have some quite obvious defect (for example, being lame, blind in one eye, or hunch-backed) or who have received some public insult, are observed to be especially inclined to derision. Desiring to see all others as unfortunate as themselves, they are very pleased by the evils that befall them, and hold them deserving of these evils.

180. *The function of mockery*

When a person shows up vices in their proper light by making them appear ridiculous without laughing at them and without showing any hatred for those who have them, he engages in that gentle mockery which is not a passion, but rather the trait of a good man. It bears witness to the cheerfulness of his temper and the tranquillity of his soul, which are signs of virtue; and it often shows the quickness of his mind, in his ability to put a pleasant gloss on the objects of his mockery. 466

181. *The function of laughter in mockery*

It is not improper to laugh when we hear someone else's mockery; we may even find it hard not to laugh. But when we ourselves engage in mockery, it is more fitting to refrain from laughing, so as not to seem to be surprised by the things we say or to wonder at our wit in thinking them up. This makes them all the more surprising to those who hear them.

1 Art. 124, p. 371 above.

182. *Envy*

What we usually call 'envy' is a vice consisting in a natural perversity which causes certain people to be annoyed at the good they see coming to others. But I am using this word here to signify a passion which is not always vicious. Envy, then, in so far as it is a passion, is a kind of sadness mingled with hatred, which results from our seeing good coming to those
 467 we think unworthy of it. Such a thought can be justified only in the case of goods due to fortune. For as regards the advantages we possess from birth – those of the soul or even of the body – the fact that we received them from God before we were capable of doing any evil suffices to make us worthy of them.

183. *How envy can be just or unjust*

But sometimes fortune gives advantages to someone who is really unworthy of them. Then envy stirs in us only because, having a natural love of justice, we are vexed that it is not upheld in the distribution of these goods. In this case our envy indicates a zeal which may be excusable, especially when the nature of the good we envy in the other person is such that in his hands it may be converted into an evil – e.g. if it is some duty or office in the exercise of which he may behave badly. When we desire the same good for ourselves and we are prevented from having it because it belongs to others who are less worthy of it, this makes the passion more violent: but it is still excusable, provided the hatred it contains relates solely to the bad distribution of the good we envy, and not to the people who possess it or distribute it. But few people are so just and so generous that they do not bear hatred towards those who forestall them in the acquisition of a good which cannot be shared by many and which they had desired for themselves, even though
 468 those who have acquired it are as much, or even more, worthy of it. And what is usually most envied is glory. For although its belonging to others does not prevent us from aspiring to it ourselves, at the same time that makes its acquisition all the more difficult and its value greater.

184. *How it comes about that envious people are apt to have a leaden complexion*

There is, moreover, no vice so detrimental to human happiness than that of envy. For, apart from the fact that those tainted with it make themselves unhappy, they also do everything in their power to spoil the pleasure of others. And they usually have a leaden complexion – that is, one that is pale, a mixture of yellow and black, like a livid bruise (hence the Latin word for envy is *livor*). This agrees very well with what was said above about the movements of the blood in sadness and hatred. For

hatred causes bile – both the yellow bile that comes from the lower part of the liver, and the black that comes from the spleen – to spread out from the heart through the arteries into all the veins. And sadness causes the blood in the veins to become less hot and flow more slowly than usual – which is enough to make the colour livid. But because there may be several different factors which cause the bile (whether yellow or black) to flow in the veins, and envy does not send it there in a sufficiently large quantity to change the colour of the complexion unless it is very great and of long duration, we must not think that everyone in whom we see this colour is inclined to envy. 469

185. *Pity*

Pity is a kind of sadness mingled with love or with good will towards those whom we see suffering some evil which we think they do not deserve. Thus it is opposed to envy in view of its object, and opposed to derision because the object is considered in a different way.

186. *Those who are most given to pity*

Those who think themselves very weak and prone to the adversities of fortune seem to be more inclined to this passion than others, because they think of the evil afflicting others as capable of befalling themselves. Thus they are moved to pity more by the love they bear towards themselves than by the love they have for others.

187. *How the most generous people are touched by this passion*

Nevertheless those who are the most generous and strong-minded, in that they fear no evil for themselves and hold themselves to be beyond the power of fortune, are not free from compassion when they see the infirmities of other men and hear their complaints. For it is a part of generosity to have good will towards everyone. But the sadness of this pity is not bitter: like that caused by the tragic actions we see represented on the stage, it is more external, affecting the senses more than the interior of the soul, which yet has the satisfaction of thinking that it is doing its duty in feeling compassion for those afflicted. There is also this difference, that whereas the ordinary man has compassion for those who complain, because he thinks the evils they suffer are very distressing, the chief object of the pity of the greatest men is the weakness of those whom they see complaining. For they think that no misfortune could be so great an evil as the timidity of those who cannot endure it with forbearance. And although they hate vices, they do not on that account hate those whom they see prone to them: they merely pity them. 470

188. *Those who are not touched by pity*

But those who are insensible to pity comprise only evil-minded and envious people who naturally hate all mankind, or people who are so
 471 brutish and so thoroughly blinded by good fortune or rendered desperate by bad fortune, that they do not think any evil could possibly befall them.

189. *Why this passion moves us to tears*

Moreover, we weep very easily in this passion because love sends a lot of blood to the heart and so causes many vapours to flow from the eyes; and the coldness of the sadness makes these vapours move more slowly and so change into tears, in accordance with what has been said above.¹

190. *Self-satisfaction*

The satisfaction of those who steadfastly pursue virtue is a habit of their soul which is called 'tranquillity' and 'peace of mind'. But the fresh satisfaction we gain when we have just performed an action we think good is a passion – a kind of joy which I consider to be the sweetest of all joys, because its cause depends only on ourselves. But when this cause is not just, i.e. when the actions from which we derive great satisfaction are
 472 not very important or are even vicious, the satisfaction is absurd and serves only to produce a kind of vanity and impertinent arrogance. This is noticeable especially in those who believe themselves devout, but are merely bigoted and superstitious. These are people who – under the pretext of frequently going to church, reciting many prayers, wearing their hair short, fasting, and giving alms – think they are absolutely perfect and imagine they are such close friends of God that they could not do anything to displease him. They suppose that anything their passion dictates is a commendable zeal, even though it sometimes dictates the greatest crimes that men can commit, such as the betrayal of cities, the killing of sovereigns, and the extermination of whole nations for the sole reason that the citizens do not accept their opinions.

191. *Repentance*

Repentance is directly opposed to self-satisfaction. It is a kind of sadness, which results from our believing that we have done some evil deed; and it is very bitter because its cause lies in ourselves alone. But this does not prevent its being very useful when the action of which we repent is truly evil and we know this for certain, because then our repentance prompts us to do better on another occasion. But it often happens that weak-

1 Art. 128, p. 373 above.

spirited people repent of deeds they have done without knowing for certain that they are evil; they are convinced of this simply because they fear it is so, and if they had done the opposite, they would repent in the same way. This is an imperfection deserving of pity, and the remedies against this fault are the same as those which serve to dispel irresolution. 473

192. *Favour*

Favour is properly speaking a desire to see good come to someone for whom we have good will. But here I use 'favour' to mean this good will in so far as it is aroused in us by some good action of the person towards whom we bear it. For we are naturally inclined to love those who do deeds we judge good even though we get no benefit from them. Favour in this sense is a kind of love, not desire, though it is always accompanied by the desire to see good come to the one whom we favour. And it is usually joined to pity because the misfortunes we see befall unfortunate persons cause us to reflect all the more on their merits.

193. *Gratitude*

Gratitude is also a kind of love aroused in us by some action on the part of the person for whom we have it – an action by which, we believe, he has done us some good, or at least he had the intention to do so. Thus it has the same content as favour, and the more so in that it is based on an action which affects us and which we desire to reciprocate. This is why it has much more strength, especially in the souls of those who are to any degree noble and generous. 474

194. *Ingratitude*

As to ingratitude, it is not a passion, for nature has not placed in us any movement of the spirits which produces it. It is simply a vice directly opposed to gratitude, in so far as the latter is always a virtue and one of the principal bonds of human society. Accordingly this vice belongs only to brutish, foolishly arrogant people who think that all things are their due, or to stupid people who never reflect on the benefits they receive. It is also found in weak and abject people who, aware of their infirmity and need, basely seek the help of others and then, having got it, hate them. They do this because, lacking the will to return the favour or despairing of their ability to do so, and thinking that everybody is grasping like themselves and that no good is ever done without the hope of recompense, they think they have deceived their benefactors.

195. *Indignation*

Indignation is a kind of hatred or aversion that we naturally have towards those who do some evil, whatever it may be. Although often 475

mingled with envy or pity, it has an object that is wholly different. For we are indignant only towards those who do good or evil to people who do not deserve it. But we are envious of those who receive such a good, and we pity those who receive the evil. It is true that to possess a good which we do not deserve is in some way to do evil. This may be the reason why Aristotle and his followers supposed envy always to be a vice, and thus called the envy which is not a vice by the name 'indignation'.¹

196. *Why indignation is sometimes joined to pity, and sometimes to derision*

To do evil is also in some way to receive evil. Consequently some people join pity to their indignation, and others derision, depending on whether
476 they bear good-will or ill-will towards those whom they see committing faults. That is why the laughter of Democritus and the tears of Heraclitus could proceed from the same cause.²

197. *Indignation is often accompanied by wonder and is not incompatible with joy*

Indignation is often accompanied by wonder too. For we usually suppose that everything will be done in the way that we judge it ought to be done – that is, in the way we consider good. This is why we are surprised, and made to wonder, when it happens otherwise. Indignation is also not incompatible with joy, though it is more usually joined to sadness. For when our indignation concerns an evil deed which cannot harm us, and we consider that we would not be willing to do such a thing, this gives us some pleasure – which is perhaps one of the causes of the laughter that sometimes accompanies this passion.³

198. *The function of indignation*

Finally, indignation is observed much more in those who wish to appear virtuous than in those who really are virtuous. For although those who
477 love virtue cannot look upon the vices of others without some aversion, they do not become incensed except at the greatest and most extraordinary vices. To be very indignant about trivial matters is to be difficult and peevish; it is unjust to be indignant about matters for which no one can be blamed; and it is impertinent and absurd not to confine one's indignation to the actions of human beings and to extend it to the works of God and nature. This is done by those who, never being content with

¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II, 9, 1386b9; *Nicomachean Ethics* II, 7, 1108b2.

² According to a story well known in later antiquity, Heraclitus wept, whereas Democritus laughed, at the follies of mankind. The origin of the story is unknown.

³ Art. 127, p. 372 above.

their condition or fortune, dare to find fault in the way the universe is regulated and in the secrets of Providence.

199. *Anger*

Anger is also a kind of hatred or aversion that we have towards those who have done some evil or who have tried to harm not just anyone they happen to meet but us in particular. Thus it has the same content as indignation, and the more so in that it is based on an action which affects us and for which we have a desire to avenge ourselves. For this desire nearly always accompanies it, and it is directly opposed to gratitude, as indignation is to favour. But it is incomparably more violent than these other three passions, because the desire to ward off harmful things and to avenge oneself is the most compelling of all desires. It is desire, joined to self-love, which makes anger involve as much agitation of the blood as courage and boldness can bring about; and hatred causes this agitation to affect primarily the bilious blood coming from the spleen and the small veins of the liver. This blood enters into the heart and there, because of its abundance and the nature of the bile with which it is mingled, it produces a heat more extreme and more intense than any that may be produced by love or joy. 478

200. *Why those whom anger causes to flush are less to be feared than those whom it causes to grow pale*

The external signs of this passion differ according to different personal temperaments and the various other passions composing it or joined to it. Thus we see some grow pale or tremble when they become angry, and others become flushed or even weep. It is usually thought that the anger of those who grow pale is more to be feared than the anger of those who become flushed. The reason for this is that when we are unwilling or unable to avenge ourselves except through our looks and words, we expend all our heat and energy from the moment we are first aroused, and this causes us to grow red. Sometimes, moreover, because we cannot avenge ourselves in any other way, we have such regret and self-pity that we are caused to weep. On the other hand, those who restrain themselves and resolve to take a greater vengeance become sad at the thought that the action which makes them angry obliges them to take such vengeance; and sometimes they also have anxiety about the evils which may ensue upon the resolution they have taken. This makes them first turn pale and cold, and start trembling. But when they later come to take vengeance, they become warm again to the degree that they were cold to begin with, just as we observe that fevers which begin with a chill usually become the most severe. 479

201. *There are two sorts of anger: the most kind-hearted persons are the most prone to the first*

This shows us that we can distinguish two kinds of anger. One flares up quickly and is quite evident in external behaviour, but it has little effect and is easy to assuage. The other is not so apparent at first, but gnaws more at one's heart and has effects that are more dangerous. Those filled with kindness and love are more prone to the first; for it does not result from a deep hatred but from an instant aversion which surprises them because they are inclined to imagine that all things ought to take place in the manner they judge to be best, and so they wonder and take offence as soon as things turn out otherwise. This often happens even though the matter does not affect them personally, because their great affection
 480 makes them concerned for those they love in the same way as for themselves. Thus, what would cause mere indignation in someone else is for them a cause of anger; and since their inclination for love fills their heart with much heat and blood, the aversion which surprises them must drive enough bile into the heart to bring about a great commotion in this blood. But this commotion does not last, because the strength of the surprise does not continue, and as soon as they perceive that the object of their anger ought not to disturb them so much, they repent of their anger.

202. *It is weak and abject souls who most allow themselves to be carried away by the second sort of anger*

The other kind of anger, in which hatred and sadness predominate, is not so apparent at first except perhaps in so far as it makes the face grow pale. But its strength is gradually increased by the agitation which a burning desire for vengeance stirs up in the blood; and the blood, being mixed with the bile driven to the heart from the lower part of the liver and spleen, produces a very keen and piercing heat there. As it is the most generous souls who have the most gratitude, so it is those with the most vanity, the most abject and weak, who let themselves most readily be
 481 carried away by this kind of anger. For the wrongs that arouse our anger appear greater in proportion as vanity increases our self-esteem and also in proportion to our esteem for the good things which they take away; and the weaker and more abject our soul, the greater our esteem for these good things, since they depend on others.

203. *Generosity serves as a remedy against the excesses of anger*

Finally, although this passion is useful in giving us the strength to ward off such wrongs, there is no passion whose excesses we should take more care to avoid. For such excesses confuse our judgement and often make us commit misdeeds of which we must afterwards repent. Sometimes

they even prevent us from warding off the wrongs as well as we could if we felt less emotion. But just as vanity more than anything else makes anger excessive, so I think that generosity is the best remedy that may be found against its excesses. For generosity causes us to hold in low esteem all the good things which may be taken away, and on the other hand to hold in high esteem the liberty and absolute control over ourselves which we cease to have when someone else is able to injure us. Thus it causes us to have nothing but contempt, or at the most indignation, for the wrongs at which others usually take offence.

204. *Pride*

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What I here call 'pride' is a kind of joy based on the love we have for ourselves and resulting from the belief or hope we have of being praised by certain other persons. Thus it is different from the internal satisfaction which comes from our belief that we have performed some good action. For we are sometimes praised for things we do not believe to be good, and blamed for those we believe to be better. But both are kinds of self-esteem, as well as kinds of joy. For seeing that we are esteemed highly by others is a reason for esteeming ourselves.

205. *Shame*

Shame, on the other hand, is a kind of sadness based also on self-love, which proceeds from the expectation or fear of being blamed. Besides that, it is a kind of modesty or humility and diffidence about oneself. For when our self-esteem is so great that we cannot imagine anyone despising us, we cannot easily be ashamed.

206. *The function of these two passions*

Pride and shame have the same function, in that they move us to virtue, the one through hope and the other through anxiety. It is necessary only to instruct our judgement regarding what truly deserves blame or praise in order that we should not be ashamed of doing good and not take pride in our vices, as many people do. But it is not good to rid oneself entirely of these passions, as the Cynics used to do. For although the common people are very bad judges, yet because we cannot live without them and it is important for us to be an object of their esteem, we should often follow their opinions rather than our own regarding the outward appearance of our actions.

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207. *Impudence*

Impudence or effrontery, which is a kind of contempt for shame and often for pride too, is not a passion because there is no specific movement

of the spirits which produces it. It is rather a vice opposed to shame and also to pride, inasmuch as these are both good, just as ingratitude is opposed to gratitude and cruelty to pity. Effrontery results chiefly from our frequently being the object of grave insults. When we are young we all imagine praise to be a good, and disgrace an evil, of greater practical importance than our subsequent experience shows them to be. This happens when, after receiving several grave insults, we see ourselves
 484 utterly stripped of honour and despised by everyone. That is why people who assess good and evil solely in terms of bodily comfort become insolent: they find that after such insults they enjoy as much of this comfort as before, or sometimes even much more of it. For they are then free from many constraints to which honour bound them, and if their disgrace involves the loss of goods, they find there are always some charitable people who will make up their loss.

208. *Disgust*

Disgust is a kind of sadness which results from the same cause as that from which joy came previously. For we are so constituted that most of the things we enjoy are good for us only for a time, and afterwards become disagreeable. This is evident especially in the case of drinking and eating, which are beneficial only so long as we have an appetite, and harmful when we no longer have one. Because such things then cease to be agreeable to our taste, this passion is called 'disgust'.¹

209. *Regret*

485 Regret is also a kind of sadness. It has a particular bitterness in that it is always joined to some despair and to the memory of a pleasure that gave us joy. For we regret only the good things which we once enjoyed and which are so completely lost that we have no hope of recovering them at the time and in the form in which we regret them.

210. *Cheerfulness*

Finally, what I call 'cheerfulness' is a kind of joy which has this peculiarity: its sweetness is increased by the recollection of the evils we have suffered, about which we feel relieved in the same way as when we feel ourselves lightened of some heavy burden which we have carried on our shoulders for a long time. I cannot see anything very remarkable in these three passions, and I have placed them here simply in order to follow the order of the enumeration which I made above. But I think this enumeration has been useful in showing that we have omitted no passions which were worthy of special consideration.

1 A play on *goût* ('taste') and *degoût* ('disgust').

211. *A general remedy against the passions*

Now that we are acquainted with all the passions, we have much less reason for anxiety about them than we had before. For we see that they are all by nature good, and that we have nothing to avoid but their misuse or their excess, against which the remedies I have explained might be sufficient if each person took enough care to apply them. I have included among these remedies the forethought and diligence through which we can correct our natural faults by striving to separate within ourselves the movements of the blood and spirits from the thoughts to which they are usually joined. But I must admit that there are few people who have sufficiently prepared themselves in this way for all the contingencies of life. Moreover, the objects of the passions produce movements in the blood which follow so rapidly from the mere impressions formed in the brain and the disposition of the organs, without any help at all from the soul, that no amount of human wisdom is capable of counteracting these movements when we are not adequately prepared to do so. Thus many people cannot keep from laughing when they are tickled, even though they get no pleasure from it. For the impression of joy and surprise, which previously made them laugh for the same reason, is awakened in their imagination and causes their lungs to be swollen suddenly and involuntarily by blood sent to them from the heart. So too, those who are strongly inclined by nature to the emotions of joy, pity, fear and anger, cannot prevent themselves from fainting, weeping, or trembling, or from having their blood all in turmoil just as if they had a fever, when their imagination is strongly affected by the object of one of these passions. But there is something we can always do on such occasions, which I think I can put forward here as the most general, and most readily applicable remedy against all excesses of the passions. When we feel our blood agitated in this way, we should take heed, and recollect that everything presented to the imagination tends to mislead the soul and make the reasons for pursuing the object of its passion appear much stronger than they are, and the reasons for not pursuing this object much weaker. When the passion urges us to pursue ends whose attainment involves some delay, we must refrain from making any immediate judgement about them, and distract ourselves by other thoughts until time and repose have completely calmed the disturbance in our blood. Finally, when it impels us to actions which require an immediate decision, the will must devote itself mainly to considering and following reasons which are opposed to those presented by the passion, even if they appear less strong. For example, when we are unexpectedly attacked by an enemy, the situation allows no time for deliberation; and yet, I think, those who are accustomed to reflecting upon their actions can always do

488 something in this situation. That is, when they feel themselves in the grip of fear they will try to turn their mind from consideration of the danger by thinking about the reasons why there is much more security and honour in resistance than in flight. On the other hand, when they feel that the desire for vengeance and anger is impelling them to run thoughtlessly towards their assailants, they will remember to think that it is unwise to lose one's life when it can be saved without dishonour, and that if a match is very unequal it is better to beat an honourable retreat or ask quarter than stupidly to expose oneself to a certain death.

212. *It is on the passions alone that all the good and evil of this life depends*

For the rest, the soul can have pleasures of its own. But the pleasures common to it and the body depend entirely on the passions, so that persons whom the passions can move most deeply are capable of enjoying the sweetest pleasures of this life. It is true that they may also experience the most bitterness when they do not know how to put these passions to good use and when fortune works against them. But the chief use of wisdom lies in its teaching us to be masters of our passions and to control them with such skill that the evils which they cause are quite bearable, and even become a source of joy.

THE END